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2Introduction
Potiphar, an officer of the Egyptian Pharaoh, bought Joseph of the hands 
of the Ishmeelites.  And it came to pass that his master’s wife cast her eyes 
upon Joseph and said, “Lie with me.”  But Joseph refused, saying, 
“because thou art his wife: how then can I do this great wickedness, and 
sin against God?”  And it came to pass, as she spake to Joseph day by 
day, he hearkened not unto her, to lie by her, or to be with her.  One day 
she caught him by his garment, saying, “Lie with me,” and he left his 
garment in her hand and fled.  And she called unto the men of her house, 
and spake unto them, saying, “See, he hath brought a Hebrew unto us to 
mock us; he came in unto me to lie with me, and I cried with a loud voice.  
And when he heard that I lifted up my voice and cried, he left his garment 
with me, and fled.”  When Potiphar came home and heard the words of his 
wife, his wrath was kindled.  And Potiphar took Joseph and put him into
prison.1
The Biblical tale of Potiphar’s wife stands as a warning to the criminal justice 
system.  It is one nightmare about rape: a spurned woman seeks revenge by falsely 
accusing an innocent man.2  This nightmare terrifies because of the helplessness of the 
weak male—in this case, a Jewish servant—and the fear of a justice system governed by 
the emotions of an irrational woman.
There is another nightmare about rape, of course, one that recurs in waking life: a 
man rapes a woman or girl he knows, taking advantage of her proximity and vulnerability 
to satisfy a cruel desire for sexual dominance.  Rape, the fear of which terrifies most 
women at some point in their lives, is dreadful enough.  But then the legal bad dream 
begins.  In great pain, the rape victim tells of her assault to police, prosecutors, judges, 
and jurors, but no one believes her.  They suspect either that she fabricated the experience 
because she wanted it or that she caused it by her own bad behavior.3  This nightmare 
should also stand as a warning to the criminal justice system, but we have no notorious 
parables, retold from ancient times, to sear it into our collective unconscious.  As a result, 
1 Genesis 39:1-23 (King James) (edited version of story).  
2
 Susan Estrich calls this story the “male rape fantasy.”   See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1140 
(1986).
3
 In his treatise Evidence, Professor Wigmore of Northwestern used Freudian psychology to conclude that 
the psychic complexes of females are “multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by bad 
social environment, partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions.”  JOHN WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 924a (3d. ed., 1940).  He quoted a doctor who alleged that sexual assaults are frequently 
“charged or claimed with nothing more substantial supporting this belief than an unrealized wish or 
unconscious, deeply suppressed sex-longing or thwarting.”  Id. (quoting Dr. W. F. Lorenz).  In their widely 
cited study, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel found that any so-called “contributory” behavior of the alleged 
rape victim (ranging from hitchhiking, to dating, to talking to men at parties) led jurors to believe that she 
assumed the risk and acquit the defendant or find him guilty of a lesser offense.  HARRY KALVEN, JR. & 
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-54 (1966).   This work has been confirmed in more recent studies.  
See GARY LAFREE, RAPE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, 200 
(1989).
3the criminal justice system has not reacted to the cynical disbelief many feel toward rape 
victims who muster the courage to come forward with the truth.4
By contrast, the criminal justice system has overreacted to infamous anecdotes of 
men falsely accused.  Three particular rules, designed to prevent irrational women from 
succeeding in levying false rape charges, arose in English common law.  First, the prompt 
complaint requirement in rape law meant that a woman had to complain swiftly of rape to 
officials or she could not obtain legal redress for the crime.  Henry de Bracton, an 
influential 13th century English legal scholar, explained:
When therefore a virgin has been so deflowered and overpowered against 
the peace of the lord the King, forthwith and whilst the act is fresh, she 
ought repair with hue and cry to the neighboring vills, and there display to 
honest men the injury done to her, the blood and her dress stained with 
blood, and the tearing of her dress, and so she ought to go to the provost of 
the hundred and to the searjeant of the lord the King, and to the coroners 
and to the viscount and make her appeal at the first county court.5
Despite the humiliation a victim might feel about revealing a degrading, personal attack, 
the prompt complaint rule required that she “forthwith and whilst the act is fresh” 
complain of being raped to “honest men … the provost … the searjeant … the coroners 
… the viscount and … the first county court.”6  If she failed to do so, she was not allowed 
to bring a claim of rape in court.7  In 1962, the Model Penal Code in the United States 
turned this rule into a strict statute of limitations, which it still contains:  
Prompt Complaint.  No prosecution may be instituted or maintained under 
this Article [for sexual offenses] unless the alleged offense was brought to 
the notice of public authority within [3] months of its occurrence…8
No other crime in the Model Penal Code, from serious felonies to petty misdemeanors, 
requires a similar prompt complaint.9
Second, the corroboration requirement in rape law meant that a man could not be 
convicted of rape unless the complainant had corroborative evidence of the assault, such 
4
 Rape is a crime unique in its gender correlation.  Rapists are overwhelmingly male and rape victims are 
overwhelmingly female.  Ninety-nine out of 100 convicted rapists are male.  LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND 
SEXUAL ASSAULT v (1997).  Ninety-four percent of all completed rape victims are female.  CALLIE MARIE 
RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: REPORTING TO POLICE AND 
MEDICAL ATTENTION 1 (2002).
5 H. DE BRACTON, 2 DELEGIBUS ANGILAE 483 (Sir Travers Twiss, ed. 1879).  Bracton served as a justice 
for King Henry III and as a justice on the Coram Rege (which evolved into the Queen’s Bench).   He 
incorporated Roman and canon law principles into English common law.  2 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
452 (1998).
6 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 483.  
7 See State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1990).
8 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4) (1980).
9 See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1139 (“The rule is unique to rape, and its justification is unique to women 
victims of sexual assault.”).  A murder prosecution may be commenced at any time; other first degree 
felonies, within six years.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 106.
4as bruises or ripped clothing that proved a struggle.  Bracton assumed a rape victim 
should be able to “display to honest men the injury done to her, the blood and her dress 
stained with blood, and the tearing of her dress.”10  The Model Penal Code turned this 
assumption into a requirement, which it still contains: “No person shall be convicted of 
any felony under this Article [for sexual offenses] upon the uncorroborated testimony of 
the alleged victim.”11  A man may be convicted of burglary or homicide upon the credible 
but uncorroborated testimony of one person, but not so with rape.12  If a rape victim does 
not have corroboration, she does not have a case.  
Third, cautionary instructions in rape law warned jurors to weigh the testimony of 
a rape complainant with particular circumspection.13  The 17th century English jurist Sir 
Matthew Hale believed that rape “is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be 
proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho’ never so innocent.”14  The 
risk of false accusers led Hale to admonish:
we may be the more cautious upon trials of this nature, wherein the court 
and the jury may with so much ease be imposed upon without great care 
and vigilance; the heinousness of the offense many times transporting the 
judge and jury with so much indignation, that they are over hastily carried 
to the conviction of the accused thereof, by the confident testimony 
sometimes of malicious and false witnesses.15
Many jurisdictions responded to Hale’s admonition by requiring courts to issue 
cautionary instructions to juries warning them to assess the complainant’s testimony in 
rape cases with extra suspicion.  The Model Penal Code continues to mandate such a 
warning: 
In any prosecution before a jury for an offense under this Article [for 
sexual offenses], the jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a 
victim or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional 
involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with 
respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private.16
10 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 483.
11 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4).
12
 Perjury is the only other crime in the Model Penal Code that contains a corroboration requirement.  
MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(6).
13
 Although most people believe that they can effectively evaluate a witness’ demeanor to determine his or 
her credibility, there is little scientific support for this belief.  Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075 (1991).  See also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, A Lick of the 
Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1162-63 
(1993).  Untrained individuals do not much better than chance in discerning lies under experimental 
conditions.  Wellborn, supra at 1087 & 1104-1105.  
14
 1 HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1st Am. Ed. 1847).  Hale was an ardent believer in 
witchcraft.  PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, A WOMAN SCORNED: ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL 62 (1997).
15 Id. at 636.
16 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4).
5Again, no other crime in the Model Penal Code requires a similar cautionary jury 
instruction.17
Legal scholars and others have criticized the prompt complaint requirement, 
corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions in the criminal law of rape for 
about three decades.18  As a result, these three doctrines have been nearly banished from 
formal law.  Only three states—California, Illinois, and South Carolina—continue to 
mandate prompt complaint, but only for spousal sexual offenses.19  Only three states 
require corroboration: Texas requires corroboration unless the complainant makes a 
prompt outcry to authorities, New York requires corroboration when a complainant’s 
mental incapacity forms the basis of her non-consent, and Ohio requires corroboration for 
the crime of sexual imposition.20  Eight states continue to require cautionary instructions 
when there is no corroboration of an alleged rape, but twenty-five other states and the 
District of Columbia prohibit judges from issuing these instructions.21  The days of the 
prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions in 
formal rape law appear to be numbered.
After scrubbing down the foul Model Penal Code and tidying up a dozen or so 
state codes on the bookshelf, one might toss these relics—prompt complaint, 
corroboration, and cautionary instructions—into the dustbin of historical misogyny, 
declare a victory for the second wave of feminism, and go home.  The problem is that 
cultural dirt from the criminal law has drifted into an adjacent room assumed to be 
17 See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1140.
18 See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 369 (1975) (arguing 
against Hale’s analysis for caution in rape cases); SANDAY, supra note 14, at 23 (stating that cautionary 
instruction creates pro-defense bias); Estrich, supra note 2, at 1138-40 (arguing against prompt complaint 
requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instruction); Rosemary Hunter, Gender in 
Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 127, 157 (1996) (proposing 
jury instruction reminding jury that it may convict solely on basis of alleged victim’s uncorroborated 
testimony); Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Paradox of the Fresh Complaint Rule, 37 B.C. L. REV. 441, 474-76 
(1996) (supporting modified fresh complaint rule that protects victim and restores her credibility, but does 
not reinforce timing myth); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a 
Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1065-66 (1991) (advocating abrogation of 
prompt complaint doctrine and arguing for jury instruction that states “absence of a prompt complaint does 
not suggest that a rape did not occur”); Georgia Wralstad Ulmschneider, Rape and Battered Women’s Self-
Defense Trials as “Political Trials”: New Perspectives on Feminists’ Legal Reform Efforts and Traditional 
“Political Trials” Concepts, 29 SUFFOLK L. REV. 85, 102 (1995) (arguing that corroboration requirement 
and cautionary jury instruction are evidence of rape law “‘safeguarding’ men from rape accusations”); 
Dawn M. DuBois, Note, A Matter of Time: Evidence of a Victim’s Prompt Complaint in New York, 53 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1087, 1109-13 (1988) (presenting alternative methods of admitting prompt complaint 
evidence through narrative testimony, testimony for rehabilitation of witness under spontaneous utterance 
exception); Donald J. Friedman, Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE
L.J. 1365 (1972) (arguing against justifications for corroboration requirement); Christine Kenmore, Note, 
The Admissibility of Extrajudicial Rape Complaints, 64 B. U. L. REV. 199, 237 (1984) (rejecting hue and 
cry and corroboration theories behind prompt complaint doctrine); Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Note, Focusing 
on the Offender’s Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 399, 411-12 (1988) (arguing that prompt complaint doctrine should be abolished); Susan N. Williams, 
Comment, Rape Reform Legislation and Evidentiary Concerns: The Law in Pennsylvania, 44 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 955, 971 (1983) (arguing that there is no merit to historical justifications for corroboration 
requirement).
19 See infra notes 100-115 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 116-154 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 155-192 and accompanying text.
6uncontaminated.  Despite the rejection of the prompt complaint requirement, 
corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions in most formal state law, some 
colleges and universities are imposing new versions of these ancient doctrines on students 
who complain to campus authorities of having been sexually victimized by other 
students.  Harvard College offers a recent example.22
In May of 2002, Harvard College adopted new procedures for complaints of 
sexual assault and other student infractions.23  The procedures stated, “Complaints must 
ordinarily be brought to the College in a timely manner.”24  If a preliminary investigation 
of a complaint indicated that the university was “unlikely to obtain information beyond 
students’ conflicting and credible accounts,” Harvard would likely “decline to pursue a 
complaint further.”25  The 2002 procedures pointed out that Harvard “ordinarily will not 
consider a case unless allegations presented by the complaining party are supported by 
independent corroborating evidence.”26  Harvard thus declared that it would “ordinarily” 
impose a prompt (“timely”) complaint requirement and an “independent corroborating 
evidence” requirement on those students who suffer sexual assault.  It also cautioned 
officials against pursuing reports in which the complainant’s “credible account” of her 
sexual abuse was the only evidence she had.  Harvard’s new rules will not only reduce 
the number of successful disciplinary proceedings against sexual assailants; they will 
deter the original complaints themselves.
The recent scandal at the Air Force Academy provides a different kind of 
example.  Since February 2003, dozens of current and recent cadets have gone public 
with their stories of mistreatment when they reported to the Air Force Academy brass that 
they had been raped by male cadets.27  Instead of investigating and punishing their 
reported attackers, the Academy often chose to discipline the female cadets for the minor 
infractions they committed on the incidents in question, such as drinking, fraternizing 
with upper class cadets, or even having sex in the dorms (referring to the alleged rape 
itself).28  Many of these female cadets were forced to leave the Academy because of these 
infractions, which ended their military careers, while their alleged attackers marched 
toward graduation unscathed.29 The suspicion that an alleged rape occurred because of 
the complainant’s bad behavior on the instance in question and the charges brought 
against a complainant does not appear to be unique to the Academy, deterring complaints 
of sexual assault on civilian campuses as well.30
22
 Harvard College refers to the undergraduate program while Harvard University refers to the 
undergraduate college, graduate schools, other academic bodies, research centers, and affiliated institutions.  
See http://www.harvard.edu/siteguide/faqs/faq110.html. 
23 See infra notes 266-269 and accompanying text.
24 See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 278-280 and accompanying text.
26 See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
27 See T. R. Reid, Academy Probes Assaults; Female Air Force Cadets Allegedly Punished for Reporting 
Rapes, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2003, at A04; Dick Foster, Ex-Cadets Keep Close Eye on Hearing, ROCKY 
MTN. NEWS, July 12, 2003, at 1A.
28 See Tillie Fong, Legal Group Arrives at AFA; Probe to See Whether Women were Chided for Reporting 
Rape, ROCKY MT. NEWS, Feb. 20, 2003, at 17A; Lee Hockstader & T.R. Reid, Academy Culture Blamed in 
Handling of Rapes; Air Force School is Male-Dominated ‘Family’, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2003, at A3. 
29 See Hockstader & Reid, supra note 28, at A3.
30 See infra notes 350-369 and accompanying text.
7These college and university practices may correlate with powerful institutional 
incentives to deter student complaints of sexual assault.  First, campus sexual assault 
cases generate negative press.  Federal law requires colleges and universities to report 
annually to the Secretary of Education the number of sexual assaults on campus and to 
publish these incidents to the wider public.31  Second, these cases expose the institution to 
potential backlash.  Colleges and universities may fear that a student disciplined for 
sexual misconduct will lodge a civil suit against the institution for procedural 
unfairness.32  Third, these cases are tough.  Reported complaints of rape on campus 
almost always involve acquaintances and alcohol.33  Irrefutable evidence—such as guns, 
knives, or broken bones—is rare.34  These cases are complicated and cumbersome to 
pursue, particularly by officials untrained in criminal procedure.  From the perspective of 
a college administrator, one case of campus rape can collapse into a small black hole, 
extinguishing resources, time, and money like light across the event horizon.35
Regardless of their personal beliefs, then, college and university administrators 
may be motivated to capitalize on an underlying societal bias against women who 
complain of rape by importing discredited doctrines from the criminal law to deter or 
facilitate early disposal of difficult cases.  If scholars continue to ignore university 
disciplinary proceedings as a site for this kind of gender bias, campus administrators may 
increasingly follow Harvard’s lead.36
Before they are completely submerged in formal criminal law, then, it is time to 
re-examine the prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary 
instructions in the criminal law of rape in order to expel them fully from campus 
disciplinary policies and practices.  Part I of this Article discusses the prompt complaint 
requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions in the criminal law 
of rape.  It traces a brief history of the three doctrines, discusses their intransigence in the 
Model Penal Code, and catalogs their weakened status in the formal criminal law of the 
fifty states and the District of Columbia.  
31 See infra notes 390-396 and accompanying text.
32
 Fernand Dutile, Students and Due Process in Higher Education: Of Interests and Procedures, 2 FL. 
COASTAL L.J. 243 (2001) (“In the process of enforcing their academic and disciplinary standards, colleges 
and Universities increasingly find themselves confronting the possibility and even the reality of litigation”); 
Lisa Tenerowicz, Note, Student Misconduct at Private Colleges and Universities: A Roadmap for 
“Fundamental Fairness” in Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 B.C. L. REV. 653, 660 (2001) (“College 
administrators are faced with mounting pressure from both sides”); Lisa Swem, Due Process Rights in 
Student Disciplinary Matters, 14 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 359 (1987) (“Students disciplinary proceedings 
frequently intimidate college and university officials”).
33 See infra notes 381-387 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 377-379 and accompanying text.
35 CAROL BOHMER & ANDREA PARROT, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON CAMPUS 92-3 (1993).   See also COMMITTEE 
TO ADDRESS SEXUAL ASSAULT AT HARVARD, PUBLIC REPORT 43 (April 2003) available at 
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~casah/files/CASAH_FinalReport.pdf (members of Harvard’s disciplinary 
board say that “a case exacts a heavy price in terms of their own personal time and can lead to frustration 
on their part”).
36
 Theo Emery, Harvard Faculty to Revisit Sexual Misconduct Policy on Campus, AP story partially 
reprinted at Harvard Handbook Becomes Hot Topic: New Sex Misconduct Policy Starts Uproar, THE 
RECORD (Bergen County, NJ), June 13, 2002, at A30 (Sheldon Steinbach, general counsel for American 
Council on Education, says, “When a prominent institution tries something innovative, other institutions 
are likely to follow.”).
8Part II analyzes the faulty assumptions behind the prompt complaint requirement, 
corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions to help explain their rejection in 
the criminal law.  Studies reveal that most victims of rape do not promptly complain to 
the police or other authorities, most rapes do not produce corroborating evidence, and 
most jurors are already cautioned by an underlying societal bias against those who claim 
rape.  This Part also examines the empirical data on the incidence of false rape reports to 
police and concludes that, although there are no solid data to support the belief that false 
complaints of rape are more common than false complaints of any other crime, there are 
ample data proving that actual experiences of rape are vastly underreported to the police.
Part III discusses the emergence of prompt complaint, corroboration, and caution 
in campus sexual assault policies and practices.  It begins by analyzing the current policy 
at Harvard College, and, after surveying other colleges’ and universities’ formal policies 
and informal practices, concludes that Harvard is not alone in its use of disreputable legal 
doctrines against rape victims.  It then analyzes why campuses would adopt abandoned 
rules from the criminal law in their own disciplinary procedures.  It describes the legal 
and institutional difficulties that campuses have policing sexual assault.  Colleges and 
universities have reasons to want to bury difficult cases; ancient doctrines from the 
criminal law of rape afford them the opportunity to do so.
Part IV proposes a method to free disciplinary proceedings from the legacy of the 
prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions in 
the criminal law of rape.  It argues that, in rejecting a prompt complaint requirement, 
sexual assault policies should allow a complainant to pursue campus disciplinary 
proceedings against a student as long as that student remains enrolled at the institution.  
In rejecting the corroboration requirement, sexual assault policies should clarify that the 
standard of proof for finding a violation of the disciplinary code is “preponderance of the 
evidence” and that a complainant’s testimony alone can be sufficient for such proof.  In 
rejecting the norms of the cautionary instruction, policies should not subject rape 
complainants to extra scrutiny or procedural hurdles in bringing their claims to the 
campus disciplinary boards.  Additionally, rape complainants should ordinarily be 
afforded amnesty for disciplinary infractions that occurred on the instance in question.  
This Part then offers model campus sexual assault provisions to effectuate these goals. 
I. The Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration Requirement, and 
Cautionary Instructions in the Criminal Law of Rape
The prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary 
instructions were three adjacent bands in a spectrum of unique legal rules designed to 
make the crime of rape harder to prove than other felonies.  The utmost resistance 
requirement,37 a virtual chastity requirement,38 and the marital rape exemption39
contributed to the difficulty rape victims had with persuading legal actors that they had 
37 See Michelle Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 962 [hereinafter 
Anderson, Reviving Resistance].
38 See Michelle Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New 
Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 60-61 (2002) [hereinafter Anderson, From Chastity 
Requirement to Sexuality License].
39 See Michelle Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences: A New Law 
on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2003).
9suffered a criminal wrong.  While these others doctrines were fairly independent of one 
another, prompt complaint, corroboration, and cautionary instructions were 
interdependent.40  For example, in many jurisdictions, if a woman failed to promptly 
complain, she would be forgiven if she had corroborative evidence of having been 
raped.41  If a woman suffered a rape that produced no corroborative evidence, a prompt 
complaint itself might serve as the necessary legal corroboration.42  A judge was 
frequently required to issue cautionary instructions in a rape case unless the complainant 
proffered corroborative evidence of the offense.43  In many jurisdictions, then, prompt 
complaint and corroboration substituted for one another and cautionary instructions were 
triggered by a complainant’s failure to promptly complain or offer corroborative evidence 
of the crime. 
The history in English common law of the prompt complaint requirement, 
corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions indicates the extent to which 
suspicion and criticism of women who complain of rape was foundational to the 
doctrines’ invention and continued vitality.  The Model Penal Code re-inscribed the three 
doctrines in modern criminal law in the United States.  However, an assessment of the 
current legal status of the three doctrines reveals the formal rejection of the Model Penal 
Code’s rationales.
A. History of the Three Doctrines
English common law required all victims of violent crime, including rape victims, 
to hue and cry.44  “Hue and cry” referred to the “outcry calling for the pursuit of a felon, 
raised by the party aggrieved” or “the pursuit of a felon with such outcry.”45  Victims 
were thereby notifying their neighbors to pursue the evildoers.46
Even after “hue and cry” was rejected as a requirement for victims of other 
serious offenses in the 1700s, courts “continued to require hue and cry in rape cases, and 
40 See Hunter, supra note 18, at 156.  Hale discussed the complainant’s credibility this way:
For instance, if the witness be of good fame, if she presently discovered the offense made 
pursuit after the offender, shewed circumstances and signs of injury . . . if the place, 
wherein the fact was done, was remote from people, inhabitants or passengers, if the 
offender fled for it; these and the like are concurring evidences to give greater probability 
to her testimony, when proved by others as well as herself.  But on the other side, if she 
concealed the injury for any considerable time after she had the opportunity to complain, 
if the place, where the fact was supposed to be committed, were near to inhabitants, or 
common recourse or passage of passengers, and she made no outcry when the fact was 
supposed to be done, when and where it is probable she might be heard by others; these 
and the like circumstances carry a strong presumption, that her testimony is false or 
feigned.
HALE, supra note 14, at 633.  Note the centrality of prompt complaint and corroboration.  A complainant 
was not credible if “she made no outcry,” but she was credible if she “shewed circumstances and signs of 
injury.”  Id.
41 See infra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
44
 State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1990).
45
 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 464 (1989).  
46
 State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1990).
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held it against the State if the woman had not confided in anyone after the attack.”47 By 
the early 1800s in the United States, courts allowed rape prosecutions to proceed despite 
the complainant’s failure to promptly hue and cry; however, they admitted evidence of 
her failure to hue and cry to discredit her testimony.48  Although the prompt complaint 
requirement waned in 1800s, a victim’s failure to promptly complain remained powerful 
evidence that an alleged rape did not occur.  Courts still accepted the common law notion 
that a complainant who was making a truthful allegation of rape would promptly cry 
out.49  For example, in 1900, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The natural instinct of a female thus outraged and injured prompts her to 
disclose the occurrence, at the earliest opportunity, to a relative or friend 
who naturally has the deepest interest in her welfare; and the absence of 
such a disclosure tends to discredit her as a witness, and may raise an 
inference against the truth of the charge.50
Until the early 1980s, courts continued to rely on the notion that a victim who did not 
promptly complain was fabricating the accusation.51
In contrast to the early prompt complaint requirement, English common law did 
not require corroboration for a rape prosecution to proceed.52  In explaining the lack of 
such a requirement, Sir Matthew Hale stated: “The party ravished may give evidence 
upon oath and is in law a competent witness; but the credibility of her testimony, and 
how far she is to be believed, must be left to the jury.”53  In his leading treatise on 
evidence, Prof. John Wigmore explained, “At common law, the testimony of the 
prosecutrix or injured person, in the trial of all offences against the chastity of women, 
was alone sufficient evidence to support a conviction; neither a second witness nor 
corroborating circumstances were necessary.”54
The first mention of the value of corroborative evidence in the United States in a 
published appeal of a rape case was in 1875 in Boddie v. State.55  In that case, the 
Supreme Court of Alabama indicated its preference for corroborative evidence in rape 
cases, but did not make corroboration a prerequisite.  The court stated: “No principal of 
law forbids a conviction on her uncorroborated testimony, though she is wanting in 
chastity, if the jury is satisfied of its truth.”56  According to this court, if the complainant 
could not present corroborative evidence, her testimony should be more closely 
scrutinized, but if, after such scrutiny, the jury found the testimony credible, the jury 
could convict.57  Several jurisdictions followed the Boddie analysis in developing rules 
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.    
50
 State v. Neel, 60 P. 510, 511 (Utah 1900).  
51 See Hill, 578 A.2d at 375-76.  
52 WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 273.  Under English common law, the only crime that required corroboration 
was perjury, which required two witnesses.  See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1137.
53 HALE, supra note 14, at 635.  
54 WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 342 (emphasis in original).
55




by statute and case law that corroboration was not required, but in its absence, the judge 
should issue cautionary instructions warning the jury that the complainant’s testimony 
should be more closely scrutinized.58
In 1886, the New York legislature became the first to enact a corroboration 
requirement for the prosecution of rape,59 a provision designed, it was stated, to protect 
the defendant from an “untruthful, dishonest, or vicious complainant.”60  The statute read: 
“No conviction can be had for abduction, compulsory marriage, rape, or defilement upon 
the testimony of the female abducted, compelled or defiled, unsupported by other 
evidence.”61  At New York’s lead, a number of other jurisdictions began requiring 
corroborative evidence in rape cases.62
One of the first courts to impose such a requirement was the Supreme Court of 
Georgia.  In 1904, the court asserted, contrary to the historical record:
The law is well established, since the time of Lord Hale, that a man shall 
not be convicted of rape on the testimony of the woman alone, unless there 
are some concurrent circumstances which tend to corroborate her 
evidence.63
Underlying the Georgia court’s decision to impose a corroboration requirement was its 
concern for false accusers.  The court stated: “Without [a corroboration requirement], 
every man is in danger of being prosecuted and convicted on the testimony of a base 
woman in whose testimony there is no truth.  The man is powerless.”64  The court gave 
examples of evidence that would satisfy the corroboration requirement: “some outcry or 
evidence that she told of the injury promptly, or her clothing was torn or disarranged, or 
her person showed signs of violence, or there were other circumstances which tend to 
corroborate her story.”65  A prompt complaint thus could function as corroborative 
evidence.
58 See Curby v. Terr., 42 Pac. 953 (Ariz. 1895); People v. Keith, 75 Pac. 304, 305 (Cal. 1904);  People v. 
Polak, 196 N.E. 513 (Ill. 1935);  State v. Anderson, 59 Pac. 180 (Ida. 1899); Ashbire v. State, 158 N.E. 227 
(Ind. 1927); Ex parte Ledington, 192 Pac. 595 (Okl. 1920); Com. v. Oyler, 197 A. 508 (Pa. 1938); 
Addington v. Com., 170 S.E. 565 (Va. 1933); O’Boyle v. State, 75 N.W. 989 (Wis. 1898); Strand v. State, 
252 Pac. 1030 (Wyo. 1927).  See also Doyle v. State, 39 Fla. 155, 162 (1897) (holding that there is no law 
requiring corroboration in order for jury to convict defendant of rape, although court may instruct jury to 
view victim’s testimony with extreme scrutiny); Monroe v. State, 13 So. 884 (Miss. 1893) (holding that 
while corroboration is not required, uncorroborated testimony of victim should be closely scrutinized for 
credibility and truthfulness).
59 See Friedman, supra note 18, at 1367.
60
 People v. Yannucci, 15 N.Y.S.2d 865, 866 (App. Div.2d Dep’t 1939) (dictum), rev’d on other grounds,
238 N.Y. 546 (1940).
61
 Law of June 15, 1886, ch. 663 § 1 [1886], N.Y. Laws 109th Sess. 953.  New York courts actually made 
the statutory requirement more stringent in the 1960s.  See People v. Tashman, N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 
Kings County 1962) (holding that victim’s pregnancy was not sufficient corroboration); Lore v. Smith, 256 
N.Y.S.2d 422 (New Rochelle City Ct. 1965) (holding that element of penetration must be corroborated); 
People v. Perez, 269 N.Y.S.2d 768 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t. 1966) (holding that corroboration requirement 
could not be satisfied by confession from defendant).
62 See Friedman, supra note 18, at 1367.  See also WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 346 n. 2.  
63




By the early 1970s, seven jurisdictions maintained a rule, either by statute or case 
law, requiring corroboration of a rape complainant’s testimony.66  By contrast, twenty-
five states had rejected such a requirement. 67  In 1973, for example, the Pennsylvania 
rape code was amended to state: “The testimony of a complainant need not be 
corroborated in prosecutions under this chapter.”68
66 See Friedman, supra note 18, at 1367.  Five jurisdictions—Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, New York, and the 
Virgin Islands—imposed the corroboration requirement by enacting legislation, and the District of 
Columbia and Nebraska imposed the requirement in the prosecution of rape cases despite the absence of 
legislation.  Id. at n.13-14.
67 See id. at 1367 n.16 (citing Boddie v. State, 52 Ala. 395, 398 (1875); Bakken v. State, 489 P.2d 120, 127 
(alas. 1971); Hodges v. State, 197 S.W.2d 52, 53 (ark. 1946); People v. Stevenson, 80 Cal. Rptr. 392, 395 
(2d Dist., 5th Div. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 1014 (1970); McQueary v. People, 110 P. 210, 212-13 
(Colo. 1910); State v. Chuchelow, 37 A.2d 689 (Conn. 1944) (dictum); Wilson v. State, 109 A.2d 381, 393 
(Del. 1954) (dictum); State v. Smith, 249 So.2d 16, 17 (Fla. 1971); Yearry v. State, 273 N.E.2d 96, 97-98 
(Ind. 1971); State v. Brown, 116 P. 508, 509 (Kans. 1911); Green v. State, 220 A.2d 131, 135 (Md. 1966); 
Commonwealth v. Bemis, 136 N.E. 597, 598 (Mass. 1922); People v. Inman, 24 N.W.2d 176, 182 (Mich. 
1946) (dictum); Blade v. State, 126 So.2d 278, 280 (Miss. 1961 ) (dictum); State v. Bouldin, 456 P.2d 830, 
834 (Mont. 1969); State v. Diamond, 264 P. 697, 698 (Nev. 1928); State v. Garcia, 199 A.2d 860, 862 (N.J. 
App. Div. 1964); State v. Johnson, 227 N.W. 560, 564 (N.D. 1929); State v. Fitzmaurice, 475 P.2d 426, 
428 (Ore. 1970); State v. Wiggin, 256 A.2d 219, 221-22 (R.I. 1969); State v. Gatlin, 38 S.E.2d 238, 240 
(S.C. 1946) (dictum); King v. State, 357 S.W.2d 42, 45-46 (Tenn. 1962); State v. Hodges, 381 P.2d 81, 82 
(Utah 1963); State v. Thomas, 324 P.2d 821, 822 (Wash. 1958) (dictum); Tway v. State, 50 P. 188-189 
(Wyo. 1897) (dictum)).
Eight states developed, either by statute or judicial decision, doctrines in which corroboration was 
preferred, but not always mandated.  See Friedman, supra note 18, at 1368.  In some states, corroboration 
of a complainant’s testimony was not necessary, but was helpful in establishing the credibility of her 
testimony.  In other jurisdictions, corroboration was only required for certain charges, such as statutory 
rape, or cases in which the alleged victim failed to promptly complain.  See id.  Hawaii and New Mexico 
required corroboration that would help to establish the truth of the victim’s complaints.  Id. at n.17.  Six 
other states, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Tennessee, and Texas, required 
corroboration in specific factual circumstances, such as cases of statutory rape, a delayed complaint, or 
when the victim was a minor.  Id. at n.18.  Additionally, ten other states required corroborating evidence 
when the evidence in the case was not reasonably sufficient to sustain a rape conviction.  See Reidhead v. 
State, 250 P.366 (1926) (corroboration is not required if witness’s testimony is “reasonable, consistent and 
not inherently impossible or improbable to a degree that would make it incredible to the ordinary man”); 
People v. White, 186 N.E.2d 351, 352 (1962) (corroboration is not required if witness’s testimony is “clear 
and convincing”); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Ky. 1970) (corroboration is not 
required if victim’s testimony is “not contradictory or incredible or inherently improbable”); State v. Field, 
170 A.2d 167, 169 (Me. 1971) (corroboration is not required, but without corroboration, victim’s testimony 
“must be scrutinized and analyzed with great care”); Bryant v. State, 478 P.2d 907, 909 (Okl. Cr. 1970) 
(corroboration is not necessary if testimony is “not inherently improbable or unworthy of credence”); 
Commonwealth v. Kretezitis, 169 A. 417, 418 (Pa. 1933) (corroboration is not required unless testimony “is 
so indefinite, contradictory or unreliable that it would be unsafe to rest a conviction thereon”); State v. 
Dachtler, 179 N.W. 653 (S.D. 1920) (corroboration is not required unless testimony is “unreliable, 
improbable,” or if victim has been “fairly impeached”); Fogg v. Commonwealth, 159 S.E.2d 616, 620 (Va. 
1968) (corroboration is not required if testimony “is credible and the guilt of the accused is believed by the 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Beacraft, 30 S.E.2d 541, 544 (W.Va. 1944) (corroboration is not 
required “unless her testimony is inherently incredible”); Gauthier v. State, 137 N.W.2d 101, 105 (1965) 
(corroboration is not required if testimony is “convincing and not inherently incredible”).  Those 
jurisdictions that retained a corroboration requirement in the 1970s began to reject it over the next decade 
or so.  By 1990, the majority of U.S. jurisdictions had abolished the corroboration requirement.  BURR W. 
JONES, JONES ON EVIDENCE, § 2.42 at 101 (Clifford S. Fishman, ed. 1992).
68 See 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3106 (West 2002).
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Cautionary instructions in the English common law of rape arose out of 
statements made by Hale in the 17th century.69  As a result of the conviction and 
execution of one rape defendant, Hale wrote, “some malicious people seeing how easy it 
was to make out such an accusation, and how difficult it was for the party accused to 
clear himself” brought forth “many indictments of rapes, wherein the parties accused 
with some difficulty escaped.”70  Hale concluded by warning:
I only mention these instances that we may be the more cautious upon 
trials of this nature, wherein the court and the jury may with so much ease 
be imposed upon without great care and vigilance; the heinousness of the 
offense many times transporting the judge and jury with so much 
indignation, that they are over hastily carried to the conviction of the 
accused thereof, by the confident testimony sometimes of malicious and 
false witnesses.71
Hale’s warning is comprehensible in light of the fact that, at the time he wrote, criminal 
defendants lacked the presumption of innocence, the standard of proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and other fundamental trial rights that the modern criminal justice 
system guarantees.72
Hale’s cautionary warning about rape complainants entered both the culture and 
common law of England and immigrated to the American legal system.73  Exactly when 
69 See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 247, 254 (Cal. 1975).
70 HALE, supra note 14, at 636.  One example involved a 63-year-old “antient wealthy man” and a fourteen-
year-old girl who accused him of rape.  The man’s defense was that he was “afflicted with a rupture so 
hideous and great” making it impossible for him to “carnally know any woman.”  Id. at 635, 636.  Hale 
instructed the man and the jury into a private room to view this “unusual evidence.”  Id. at 636.  The jury 
confirmed “that it was impossible he should have to do with any woman in that kind, much less to commit 
a rape, for all his bowels seemed to be fallen down in those parts, that they could scarce discern his 
privities, the rupture being full as big as the crown of a hat.”  Id.  Thus, Hale concluded, the man had been 
falsely accused and was rightly acquitted.  Id.  Hale also briefly described another example.  The case 
involved a man who was accused of raping two young girls. Id.  Prior to the judgment, however, Hale 
noted, “it was apparently discovered, that it [the rape] was but a malicious contrivance, and the party 
innocent; he was therefore reprieved before judgment.”  Id. at 635.
71 Id. at 636.
72 People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 247, 256 (Cal. 1975).  Some historians maintain that rape was 
sometimes a “prelude to a marriage” because an unwed victim could save her assailant from serious 
punishment, including death, by agreeing to marry him.  See 2 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC 
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 491 (2nd ed. 1899); BRACTON supra note 5, at 491, 
n.148.  One reason for widespread suspicion toward rape complainants was the concern that lower class 
women could use charges of rape to force wealthier men to marry them.  POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra, at 
491 n.4.  The concern for fabricated rape stories should be understood in the context of the traditional 
English preoccupation with the use of criminal charges as blackmail.  People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 
247, 257 (Cal. 1975).   See also Antony E. Simpson, The ‘Blackmail’ Myth and the Prosecution of Rape 
and Its Attempt in 18th-Century London: The Creation of a Legal Tradition, 77 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 
101, 109 (1986)).  Simpson found that defense lawyers of 18th century England used the blackmail myth
quite effectively despite the fact that, after his examination of legal records between 1730 and 1830, 
however, he found few actual attempts of extortion.  Id. at 121.
73
 Thomas Morris, Note, The Empirical, Historical and Legal Case Against the Cautionary Instruction: A 
Call for Legislative Reform, 1988 DUKE L.J. 154 (1988).
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cautionary jury instructions in rape trials entered American law is unclear; however, by 
1856 the California Supreme Court stated:
From the days of Lord Hale to the present time, no case has ever gone to 
the jury upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, unsustained by facts 
and circumstances corroborating it, without the Court warning them of the 
danger of a conviction on such testimony.74
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, courts cited Hale’s warnings of “the confident 
testimony sometimes of malicious and false witnesses” to justify requiring instructions 
cautioning juries to weigh rape complainants’ testimony with extra suspicion.75  Hale’s 
concern with false accusers thus resonated with both legislatures and judges.
B. Model Penal Code on the Three Doctrines
When the Model Penal Code was initially drafted in 1962, no jurisdiction 
continued to bar a rape prosecution for a lack of prompt complaint.76  Nevertheless, the 
drafters of the Model Penal Code formulated the prompt complaint rule as a strict statute 
of limitations for sexual offense complaints.77  That rule remains in the current version of 
the Code:
Prompt Complaint.  No prosecution may be instituted or maintained under 
this Article [for sexual offenses] unless the alleged offense was brought to 
the notice of public authority within [3] months of its occurrence….78
Therefore, no prosecutor may initiate a case against a defendant for rape, gross sexual 
imposition, deviate sexual intercourse by force or imposition, corruption of minors and 
seduction, sexual assault, or indecent exposure unless the victim made a complaint to 
authorities within three months of the occurrence.79
Under the Model Penal Code, a murder prosecution may be commenced at any 
time; other first degree felonies within six years; all other felonies within three years; 
misdemeanors within two years; and petty misdemeanors within six months.80  The three-
74 People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 223 (1856).
75
 Armand Arabian, The Cautionary Instruction in Sex Cases: A Lingering Insult, SW. U. L. REV 656, 686 
(1978).
76 See Estrich, supra note 2, at 1139.
77 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1 (rape and gross sexual imposition), 213.2 (deviate sexual intercourse by 
force or imposition), 213.3. (corruption of minors and seduction), 213.4 (sexual assault), 213.5 (indecent 
exposure) (1980).
78 Id. at § 213.6(4).  The provision continues, “or where the alleged victim was less than [16] years old or 
otherwise incompetent to make complaint, within [3] months after a parent, guardian or other competent 
person specially interested in the victim learns of the offense.”  Id.  Although an early draft of the Code put 
the proposed statute of limitations at 6 months, this time frame was halved in the 1962 Official Draft.  
79 Id. See also MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1 (rape and gross sexual imposition), 213.2 (deviate sexual 
intercourse by force or imposition), 213.3. (corruption of minors and seduction), 213.4 (sexual assault), 
213.5 (indecent exposure).   See provisions for minor victims in previous footnote.
80 MODEL PENAL CODE § 106 (1980).
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month prompt complaint rule in the Model Penal Code, therefore, places forcible rape 
and other sexual offenses at about half the level of shoplifting.81
The Commentary to the 1962 Model Penal Code analyzed the prompt complaint 
requirement in this way:
The possibility that pregnancy might change a willing participant in the 
sex act into a vindictive complainant, as well as the sound reasoning that 
one who has, in fact, been subjected to an act of violence will not delay in 
bringing the offense to the attention of the authorities, are sufficient 
grounds for setting some time limit upon the right to complain.  Likewise, 
the dangers of blackmail or psychopathy of the complainant make 
objective standards imperative.82
By 1980, the Model Penal Code’s Commentary had modified its defense:
The requirement of prompt complaint springs in part from a fear that 
unwanted pregnancy or bitterness at a relationship gone sour might 
convert a willing participant in sexual relations into a vindictive 
complainant.  Barring prosecution if no report is made within a reasonable 
time is one way of guarding against such fabrication.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the provision limits the opportunity for blackmailing another 
by threatening to bring a criminal charge of sexual aggression.83
Both the 1962 and 1980 commentaries thus relied on the fear of a false accuser to justify 
the prompt complaint rule.84
The Model Penal Code also includes a corroboration requirement for all sexual 
felonies.85  It states: “No person shall be convicted of any felony under this Article [for 
sexual offenses] upon the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim.”86  Therefore, 
no person may be convicted of the felonies of rape, gross sexual imposition, deviate 
sexual intercourse by force or imposition, corruption of minors less than 16 years old, or 
seduction unless the complainant can corroborate her testimony with other evidence.87  A 
man may be convicted of robbery or assault upon the credible but uncorroborated 
testimony of one person, but not so with rape.  
The Commentary to the Model Penal Code argues that the “most persuasive” 
justification for the corroboration requirement, like the prompt complaint requirement, “is 
the difficulty of defending against false accusation of a sexual offense.”88  The 
Commentary continues: “In no other context is felony liability premised on conduct that 
81 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2)(b) (1980).
82
 Comments, § 207.4(23) at 265.
83 Id. at § 213.6 comment at 421.
84
 The commentaries even boasted that the prompt complaint requirement is a new “innovation in Anglo-
American law” because before the Code, failure to make a prompt complaint did not bar prosecution for 
rape in any state.  Id. at § 213.6 comment on prompt complaint requirement.
85 Id. at § 213.6(5).
86 MODEL PENAL CODE  § 213.6(5), Part II, vol. 1, 412 (A.L.I. 1980).
87 MODEL PENAL CODE  §§ 213.1(1)-(2), 213.2, 213.3(1)(a) (A.L.I. 1980).
88
 Comments, § 207.4 (23) at 428.
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under other circumstances may be welcomed by the ‘victim.’”89  When proof comes 
down to conflicting accounts between the complainant and the defendant, “the 
corroboration requirement is an attempt to skew resolution of such disputes in favor of 
the defendant.”90  The Commentary insists:
In short, the corroboration requirement should not be understood as an 
effort to discount female testimony or as an unsympathetic understanding 
of the female experience with sexual aggression.  It is, rather, only a 
particular implementation of the general policy that uncertainty should be 
resolved in favor of the accused.91
The only other time that the Model Penal Code implements “the general policy that 
uncertainty should be resolved in favor of the accused” with this peculiar requirement of 
corroboration, however, is for the crime of perjury.92  As the only statutory analogy to 
sexual offenses in terms of corroboration, perjury—the crime of making a false 
statement—is particularly revealing of the Model Penal Code’s concern that women 
falsely claim rape.  For all other crimes, the rule of lenity and the standard of proof of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt satisfies the “general policy that uncertainty should be 
resolved in favor of the accused.”93
The Model Penal Code also includes special cautionary jury instructions that 
judges must administer in prosecutions for any sexual offense.94  The Code indicates: 
In any prosecution before a jury for an offense under this Article [for 
sexual offenses], the jury shall be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a 
victim or complaining witness with special care in view of the emotional 
involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with 
respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private.95
The Commentary to the 1962 Code analyzed the cautionary instruction in this way:
A general caution to the authorities against convicting on the bare 
testimony of the prosecutrix may be desirable in view of the probable 
special psychological involvement, conscious or unconscious, of judges 
and jurors in sex offenses charged against others.  The only rational 
alternative would be to require corroboration as to every element of the 
crime, since there is no reason to believe that the complainant is more 
likely to lie or deceive herself on one point rather than another.  A 




91 Id. at 429.  
92 MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.1(6).
93
 Comments, § 207.4 (23) at 429.
94 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5).
95 Id.
96
 Comments, § 207.4 (23) at 429.
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The Commentary thereby contrasted two possible legal rules in sexual offense cases in 
light of the conscious or unconscious “special psychological involvement” of both judges 
and jurors in offenses of a sexual nature.  First, courts could require corroboration of 
every element of the crime because “there is no reason to believe that the complainant is 
more likely to lie or deceive herself on one point rather than another.”97  This rule was 
rejected, however, as posing insurmountable obstacles for the state.  Second, courts could 
issue cautionary instructions to warn jurors against the “bare testimony” of a potentially 
lying or self-delusional woman who complains of rape.98  This rule was accepted as 
superior to its alternative.  The two alternatives reveal the interplay between the 
corroboration requirement and cautionary instructions in rape law.  Both are attempts to 
address the extraordinary problem in sexual offense crimes that the complainant might 
“lie or deceive herself.”99
Interestingly, it is unclear who is more at risk of suffering from feeling an 
irrational “involvement” in the crime—victims or judges and jurors.  The Model Penal 
Code’s cautionary instruction itself warns against the “emotional involvement” of the 
“complaining witness,” while the 1962 Commentary warns against the “special 
psychological involvement” of judges and jurors.  In any case, by 1980, the Code’s 
drafters deleted their involved defense of the instruction in the Commentary, although the 
cautionary instruction itself remained.
C. Current Law on the Three Doctrines
Despite the vigor with which the Model Penal Code continues to embrace the 
prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions for 
sexual offenses, the vast majority of American jurisdictions have formally spurned these 
three doctrines.  A prompt complaint requirement, for example, remains today in only 
three states—California, Illinois and South Carolina—and in those jurisdictions it applies 
only to spousal sexual offenses.100  The California code indicates:
no prosecution shall be commenced [for spousal rape] unless the violation 
was reported to medical personnel, a member of the clergy, an attorney, a 
shelter representative, a counselor, a judicial officer, a rape crisis agency, 
a prosecuting agency, a law enforcement officer, or a firefighter within 
one year after the date of the violation. This reporting requirement shall 
not apply if the victim’s allegation of the offense is corroborated by 




100 CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 2002); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. CH. 720 § 5/12-18(c) (West 2002); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-3-615(B) (West 2001).
101 CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (5)(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).  Prompt complaint is also required in Texas, 
but only in situations where there is no corroborating evidence. TEX. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a) 
(West 2001).  
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In California, therefore, failure to complain within one year of spousal rape may be offset 
by corroborating evidence of the offense.  There is no prompt complaint requirement for 
non-spousal sexual offenses in California.102
Illinois has adopted a modified version of the Model Penal Code rule on prompt 
complaint and applied it to spousal offenses as well:
Prosecution of a spouse of a victim under this subsection for any violation 
by the victim’s spouse of [criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal 
sexual assault, criminal sexual abuse or aggravated criminal sexual abuse] 
is barred unless the victim reported such offense to a law enforcement 
agency or the State’s Attorney’s office within 30 days after the offense 
was committed, except when the court finds good cause for the delay.103
The thirty-day complaint provision is substantially more restrictive than California’s time 
frame of one year, although it contains a “good cause” exception.104  There is also no 
prompt complaint requirement for non-spousal sexual offenses in Illinois.105
The South Carolina code for sexual battery provides:
The offending spouse’s conduct must be reported to appropriate law 
enforcement authorities within thirty days in order for that spouse to be 
prosecuted for this offense.106
South Carolina is even stricter than Illinois because it requires a complaint within thirty 
days but does not provide a “good cause” exception.107  Like California and Illinois, 
South Carolina’s code does not require a prompt complaint for non-spousal sexual 
offenses.108
Not only is prompt complaint for sexual offenses rarely formally required in 
contemporary law, a modern “fresh complaint” doctrine allows courts to admit evidence 
that a complainant promptly reported her victimization to bolster her testimony.109  In 
State v. Hill,110 the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the common law requirement 
102 See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261-262 (West 2001).
103 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. CH. 720 § 5/12-18(c) (West 2002) at § 5/12-18(c).
104 Id.  No case law in the state reveals exactly what “good cause” is.
105 See generally ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. CH. 720 § 5/12-18 (West 2002).
106 S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-615(B), § 16-3-658 (West 2001).  Sexual battery is defined as “sexual 
intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of a 
person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body, except when such 
intrusion is accomplished for medically recognized treatment or diagnostic purposes.”  Id. at § 16-3-651(h).  
Spousal sexual battery is sexual battery “accomplished through use of aggravated force, defined as the use 
or the threat of use of a weapon or the use or threat of use of physical force or physical violence of a high 
and aggravated nature, by one spouse against the other spouse if they are living together . . . .”  Id. at § 16-
3-615(A).
107 Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-615(B), § 16-3-658 (West 2001) with ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. CH. 720 
§ 5/12-18(c) (West 2002).
108 See generally S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-651-658 (West 2001).
109 See Stanchi, supra note 18, at 446.
110
 578 A.2d 370, 377 (N.J. 1990).
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of a prompt complaint, but concluded that a court could still admit evidence of a prompt 
complaint where it existed:  
If we were to eliminate the fresh-complaint rule, rape victims would suffer 
whenever members of the jury held prejudices that women who do not 
complain have not really been raped.... Hence, until there is a clearer 
understanding of the perception of rape and its women victims, we think 
that the better solution is to allow fresh-complaint testimony to be 
admitted.111
As a result of similar analysis, states now usually allow for the admission of the fact of a 
rape victim’s prompt complaint to corroborate the victim’s testimony.112  For example, 
the Virginia code states: “in any prosecution for criminal sexual assault . . . the fact that 
the person injured made complaint of the offense recently after commission of the 
offense is admissible, not as independent evidence of the offense, but for the purpose of 
corroborating the testimony of the complaining witness.”113  Pennsylvania’s criminal 
code states: 
111 Id. at 378.  The Supreme Court of California re-examined the fresh complaint doctrine in People v. 
Brown.  883 P.2d 949 (Cal. 1994).  The court stated that the admissibility of fresh complaint evidence
should not turn on whether the complaint was made in a timely manner following the alleged incident, as 
mandated by the traditional rule, but rather should turn on whether general evidentiary principles would 
permit such evidence to be admitted.  See id. at 959.  Because evidence of the fact of a complaint would not 
be barred by hearsay rules or any other principles, it should be admitted.  See id.
112 See Aaron v. State, 139 So. 2d 309 (Ala. 1961); Greenway v. State, 626 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1980); State 
v. Navarro, 367 P.2d 227 (Ariz. 1961); Gabbard v. State, 285 S.W.2d 515 (Ark. 1956); People v. Brown, 
883 P.2d 949 (Cal. 1994); People v. Montague, 508 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1973); Connecticut v. Troupe, 677 
A.2d 917 (Conn. 1996); State v. Brewer, 114 A. 604 (Del. 1921); Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211 
(D.C. App. 1993); Lyles v. State, 412 So. 2d 458 (Fla. App. 1982); Epps v. State, 118 S.E.2d 574 (Ga. 
1961); Territory v. Nishi, 24 Haw. 677 (1919); State v. Hall, 397 P.2d 261 (Idaho 1964); People v. Lawler,
568 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 1991); Woods v. State, 119 N.E.2d 558 (Ind. 1954); State v. Ladehoff  122 N.W.2d 829 
(Iowa 1963); State v. Hoskinson, 96 P. 138 (Kan. 1908); Cook v. Commonwealth, 351 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. 
1961); State v. Robertson, 89 La. Ann. 618 (1886); State v. Calor, 585 A.2d 1385 (Me. 1991); State v. 
Werner, 489 A.2d 1119 (Md. 1985); Commonwealth v. Licata, 591 N.E.2d 672 (Mass. 1992); People v. 
Taylor, 239 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. App. 1976); State v. Blohm, N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 1979); Carr v. State, 208 
So. 2d 886 (Miss. 1968); State v. Van Doren, 657 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. App. 1983); State v. Peres, 71 P. 162 
(1903); State v. Daniels, 388 N.W.2d 446 (Neb. 1986); State v. Campbell, 17 P. 620 (Nev. 1888); State v. 
Lynch, 45 A.2d 885 (N.H. 1946); State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1990); State v. Baca, 242 P.2d 1002 
(N.M. 1952); People v. McDaniel, 611 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1993); State v. Freeman, 5 S.E. 921 (N.C. 1888);
State v. Gebhard, 13 N.W.2d 290 (N.D. 1944); Johnson v. State, 17 Ohio 593 (1848); State v. Brown, 1977 
Ohio App. LEXIS 9839 (1977); Roberts v. State, 194 P.2d 219 (Okla. Crim. 1948); State v. Campbell, 705 
P.2d 694 (Ore. 1985); Commonwealth v. Green, A.2d 371 (Pa. 1979); State v. Russo, 142 A. 543 (R.I. 
1928); Simpkins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 142 (S.C. 1991); State v. Twyford, 186 N.W.2d 545 (S.D. 1971); State
v. Kendricks,  891 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. 1994); Vera v. State, 709 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); State
v. Martinez,  326 P.2d 102 (Utah 1958); State v. Willett, 62 A. 48 (Vt. 1905); Pepoon v. Commonwealth, 66 
S.E.2d 854 (Va. 1951); State v. Ferguson, 667 P.2d 68 (Wash. 1983); State v. Golden, 336 S.E.2d 198 
(W.Va. 1985); Hannon v. State, 36 N.W. 1 (Wis. 1888); Elliott v. State, 600 P.2d 1044 (Wyo. 1979).
113 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-268.2 (West 2002).  Virginia courts have said that the only time constraint is, 
“the complaint have been made without a delay which is unexplained or is inconsistent with the occurrence 
of the offense.”  Id. The Court of Appeals of Virginia has identified possible reasonable explanations for 
delay, including fear of disbelief by others and fear of threat of further harm by the assailant.  Whether to 
20
Prompt reporting to public authority is not required in a prosecution under 
this chapter: Provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be 
construed to prohibit a defendant from introducing evidence of the 
complainant’s failure to promptly report the crime if such evidence would 
be admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence.114
The rule in most jurisdictions, then, is that evidence of prompt complaint may be 
admitted to bolster the victim’s testimony and the defendant may attack its absence to 
discredit her testimony.115
admit the complaint is a matter for the court, but once admitted, the timeliness of the complaint is a matter 
for the jury to consider when weighing evidence, including the credibility of the prosecutrix.
In 1993, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia examined the fresh complaint doctrine 
in Battle v. U.S, 630 A.2d 211 (D.C.Cir. 1993).  The court reasoned that the fresh complaint doctrine was 
necessary for the benefit of the complainant for several reasons:  
First, evidence of a complaint of rape negates jurors’ assumptions that if there is no 
evidence of a complaint, no complaint was made... Second, such evidence negates 
prejudices held by some jurors by showing that the victim behaved as society 
traditionally has expected sexual assault victims to act, i.e., by promptly telling someone 
of the crime...Third, such evidence rebuts an implied charge of recent fabrication, which 
springs from some jurors’ assumptions that sexual offense victims are generally lying and 
that the victim's failure to report the crime promptly is inconsistent with the victim's 
current statement that the assault occurred.
Id. at 217.  The Battle court explained that the prosecution was allowed to present fresh complaint evidence 
to corroborate the complainant’s testimony, and to rebut any inferences that the complainant’s testimony 
was not credible.  See id.
114 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3105 (West 2002).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that 
prompt complaint is:
competent evidence, properly admitted when limited to establish that a complaint was 
made . . . . Conversely, unexplained lack of evidence of hue and cry that one might 
expect to ensue from rape casts doubt on the existence of the rape itself.  
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 441 A.2d 1327, 1331-32 (Pa. 1982).  Freeman contended that the trial court 
improperly admitted evidence of the victim’s prior complaints of the rape to third parties.  See id. at 1331.  
The court explained that, while the Pennsylvania Crimes Code no longer requires prompt complaint 
evidence, it allows the evidence in as long as it is limited to the fact that a complaint was made.  Id.
115
 The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Licata, 591 N.E.2d 672 (Mass. 1992), adopted a 
somewhat unique variation on the fresh complaint doctrine: not only is the fact of a fresh complaint 
admissible, the details of that complaint are also admissible.  See id. at 675.  Almost all other states 
consider the details of the complaint inadmissible.  See Aaron v. State, 139 So.2d 309, 316 (Ala. 1961); 
Greenway v, State, 626 P.2d 1060, 1061 n.4 (Alaska 1980); Bing v. State, 740 S.W.2d 156, 157-58 (Ark. 
1987); People v. Burton, 359 P.2d 433, 444 (Cal. 1961); People v. Montague, 508 P.2d 388, 389 (Colo. 
1973); Connecticut v. Troupe, 677 A.2d 917, 928-29 (Conn. 1996); Fitzgerald v. United States, 443 A.2d 
1295, 1305 (D.C. 1982); Custer v. State, 34 So.2d 100, 110 (Fla. 1947); Epps v. State, 118 S.E.2d 574, 578 
(Ga. 1961); State v. Hall, 397 P.2d 261, 267 (Id. 1964); People v. Robinson, 383 N.E.2d 164, 168 (Ill. 
1978); Woods v. State, 119 N.E.2d 558, 562 (Ind. 1954); State v. Grady, 183 N.W.2d 707, 718 (Iowa 
1971); Cook v. Commonwealth, 351 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Ky. 1961); State v. Calor, 585 A.2d 1385, 1387 
(Me. 1968); Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 888 (Miss. 1968); State v. Van Doren, 657 S.W.2d 708, 716 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1983); State v. Daniels, 388 N.W.2d 446, 450 (Neb. 1986); State v. Baca, 242 P.2d 1002, 1004 
(N.M. 1952); People v. Stripling, 162 A.D.2d 1029 (N.Y. 1990); State v. Campbell, 705 P.2d 694, 699-700 
(Or. 1985); Commonwealth v. Green, 409 A.2d 371, 374-75 (Pa. 1979); State v. Harrison, 113 S.E.2d 783, 
784 (S.C. 1960); State v. Twyford, 186 N.W.2d 545, 548 (S.D. 1971); Vera v. State, 709 S.W.2d 681, 685 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Moore v. Commonwealth, 278 S.E.2d 822, 826 (Va. 1981); State v. Ferguson, 667 
P.2d 68, 72 (Wash. 1983); State v. Golden, 336 S.E.2d 198, 203 (W.Va. 1985)
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Like the traditional prompt complaint requirement, the corroboration requirement 
has also been almost eradicated from formal rape law.  Only three states—New York, 
Ohio, and Texas—continue to impose a corroboration requirement in their criminal codes 
for certain sexual offenses.  New York requires corroboration of the complainant’s 
testimony only when her lack of consent is due to her mental defect or incapacity.116
Ohio requires corroboration of the complainant’s testimony for the crime of “sexual 
imposition,”117 but not for other sexual offenses.118  The Texas code states:
116 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.16 (West 2002).  The relevant statute provides that a person may not be 
convicted, solely on the testimony of the victim, for a sexual offense of which lack of consent is an element 
when that lack of consent “results solely from incapacity to consent because of the victim’s mental defect, 
or mental incapacity.”  Id. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (West 2002) (stating that lack of consent is an 
element of every offense in Article 130, except for consensual sodomy).  The offenses in Article 130 
(sexual offenses) that require lack of consent as an element include the following:  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
130.20 (West 2002) (sexual misconduct); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25 (West 2002) (rape in third degree); 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.30 (West 2002) (rape in second degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (West 2002) 
(rape in first degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.40 (West 2002) (sodomy in third degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
130.45 (West 2002) (sodomy in second degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.50 (West 2002) (sodomy in first 
degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.55 (West 2002) (sexual abuse in third degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.60 
(West 2002) (sexual abuse in second degree); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.65 (West 2002) (sexual abuse in 
third degree).  There are no corroboration requirements for testimony by victims in sexual offense cases in 
which lack of consent does not result from mental incapacity or defect.  People v. Soulia, 695 N.Y.S.2d 
179, 182-83 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (discussing corroboration requirements in cases in which lack of 
consent results from mental incapacity and how that was not at issue in instant case); People v. Miller, 640 
N.Y.S.2d 904 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 1996) (holding that corroboration is not required to establish crime of 
sexual abused when predicated upon allegation of forcible compulsion).
117 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06(B) (West 2002).  The required corroboration does not have to be 
independently sufficient to convict the defendant and need not go to every element of the crime of sexual 
imposition.  See State v. Economo, 666 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Oh. 1996).  Rather, only slight circumstances are 
required to support the victim’s testimony.  Id.  One court defined the required evidence to be “minimal.”  
See City of Avon Lake v. Pinson, 695 N.E.2d 1178, 1179 (Ohio App. 1997).  “Minimal evidence” was 
defined as “slight circumstances or evidence which tends to support the victim’s testimony.”  Id.  Sexual 
imposition is defined as: 
No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender; cause 
another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause 
two or more other persons to have sexual contact when any of the following applies: 
(1) The offender knows that the sexual contact is offensive to the other person, or one of 
the other persons, or is reckless in that regard. 
(2) The offender knows that the other person’s, or one of the other person’s, ability to 
appraise the the nature of or control the offender’s or touching person’s conduct is 
substantially impaired.
(3) The offender knows that the other person, or one of the other persons, submits 
because of being unaware of the sexual contact.
(4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is thirteen years of age or older but less 
than sixteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of such person, and 
the offender is at least eighteen years of age and four or more years older than such other 
person.
(5) The offender is a mental health professional, the other person or one of the other 
persons is a mental health client or patient of the offender, and the offender induces the 
other person who is the client or patient to submit by falsely representing to the other 
person who is the client or patient that the sexual contact is necessary for mental health 
treatment purposes.
118 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2002) (rape); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West 2002) 
(sexual battery); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05 (West 2002) (gross sexual imposition).  
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A conviction [for sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault] is 
supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual 
offense if the victim informed any person, other than the defendant, of the 
alleged offense within one year after the date on which the offense is 
alleged to have occurred.119
Texas thus allows corroboration and prompt complaint to offset one another in sexual 
assault cases.  In McBride v. State, for example, a Texas appellate court did not require 
corroboration of the rape complainant’s testimony because she made a prompt outcry.120
In Friedel v. State, by contrast, a Texas appellate court reversed a rape conviction 
because the complainant did not present corroborating evidence or promptly complain.121
Fourteen other state codes indicate that corroboration of a sexual offense 
complainant’s testimony is not required.122  The remaining thirty-three states’ codes are 
119 TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.07(a) (West 2001).  The one year reporting requirement does not 
apply if the victim was, at the time of the offense, seventeen years of age or younger, sixty-five years of age 
or older, or eighteen years of age or older but “by reason of age or physical or mental disease, defect, or 
injury was substantially unable to satisfy the person’s need for food, shelter, medical care, or protection 
from harm.”  Id. § 38.07(b)(1)-(3). 
Sexual assault is when “[a] person commits an offense if the person: (1) intentionally or 
knowingly: (A) causes the penetration of the anus or female sexual organ of another person by any means, 
without that person’s consent; (B) causes the penetration of the mouth of another person by the sexual 
organ of the actor, without that person’s consent; or (C) causes the sexual organ of another person, without 
that person’s consent, to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including 
the actor….”  TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011(a).
Aggravated sexual assault is sexual assault when the person “(i) causes serious bodily injury or 
attempts to cause the death of the victim or another person in the course of the same criminal episode; (ii) 
by acts or words places the victim in fear that death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping will be 
imminently inflicted on any person; (iii) by acts or words occurring in the presence of the victim threatens 
to cause the death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping of any person; (iv) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon 
in the course of the same criminal episode; (v) acts in concert with another who engages in conduct 
described by Subdivision (1) directed toward the same victim and occurring during the course of the same 
criminal episode; or (vi) administers or provides flunitrazepam, otherwise known as rohypnol, gamma 
hydroxybutyrate, or ketamine to the victim of the offense with the intent of facilitating the commission of 
the offense; . . .”   Id. at § 22.021(2)(A).
120
 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 1284 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) at *17.
121
 832 S.W.2d 420, 421-22 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
122 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022  (West 2002) amended by 2002 FLA. SESS. LAW SERV. CH. 2002-211 (H.B. 
1399) (West) (testimony of victim need not be corroborated in prosecution for sexual battery);   ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. CH. 720 §16-3-657 (West 2002) (testimony of victim need not be corroborated for criminal 
sexual conduct); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520(h) (West 2002) (testimony of victim need not be 
corroborated in prosecutions for non-statutory sexual offenses); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (1) (West 
2002) amended by 2002 MINN. SESS. LAW. SERV. CH. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (testimony of victim need 
not be corroborated); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2028 (West 2002) (requiring no corroboration for testimony of 
sexual assault victims); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:6 (West 2002) (no requirement of corroboration for 
victim’s testimony in prosecutions for sexual offenses under same chapter); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-15 
(West 2002) (indicating corroboration of victim’s testimony not required for § 30-9-11 Criminal Sexual 
Penetration, § 30-9-12 Criminal Sexual Contact, § 30-9-13 Criminal Sexual Contact of a Minor, and § 30-
9-14 Indecent Exposure); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3106 (West 2002) (testimony by complainants does 
not need corroboration in prosecutions of sexual offenses); R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 11-37-11 (West 2001) 
(testimony of victim is not required to be corroborated in prosecutions for sexual assault); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-657 (West 2001) (no corroboration required for prosecution of criminal sexual conduct in first, 
second, and third degrees, and criminal sexual conduct with a minor), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-22-15.1 
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silent on the issue of corroboration.  However, case law from each of these states 
indicates that corroboration of the complainant’s testimony is not ordinarily required.  
Twenty-two states—Alabama,123 Arkansas,124 California,125 Colorado,126 Delaware,127
Georgia,128 Hawaii,129 Idaho,130 Illinois,131 Indiana,132 Iowa,133 Louisiana,134 Maine,135
Maryland,136 Nevada,137 New Jersey,138 North Carolina,139 North Dakota,140 Oregon,141
(West 2002) (testimony of complainant in sex offense case may not be treated differently than 
complainant’s testimony in any other criminal case); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 3255 (West 2002) 
(corroborative evidence not required for rape); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020 (1) (West 2002) (no 
requirement of corroboration of victim’s testimony for convictions of sex offenses); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-
2-311 (West 2002) (no requirement of corroboration for sexual assault).
123
 Myers v. State, 677 So.2d 807 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (“[I]t is well settled that a conviction for rape 
may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim.”).
124
 Freeman v. State, 959 S.W.2d 400 (Ark. 1998) (uncorroborated testimony of rape victim is sufficient to 
sustain conviction of rape).
125
 People v. Poggi, 753 P.2d 1082 (Cal. 1988) (conviction of sex crime may be sustained on 
uncorroborated testimony of complainant).
126
 People v. Fierro, 606 P.2d 1291 (Colo. 1980) (corroboration of victim’s testimony is not essential in 
criminal prosecution for unlawful sexual acts and that need for corroboration should be assessed by jury).
127
 State v. Stewart, 1987 Del. Super. LEXIS 990 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987) (Delaware law does not require 
corroborating evidence).
128
 Hutchison v. State, 522 S.E.2d 56 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (corroboration no longer necessary to establish 
rape).
129
 State v. Jones, 617 P.2d 1214 (Haw. 1980) (law does not require corroboration of complaining witness 
in rape prosecution).
130
 State v. Allen, 929 P.2d 118 (Idaho 1996) (Idaho does not require corroboration of testimony in rape 
cases); State v. DeGrat, 913 P.2d 568 (Idaho 1996) (no longer requires corroboration in sexual crime trials).
131
 People v. Carlson, 663 N.E.2d 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (in sex offense cases law does not require victim’s 
testimony to be substantially corroborated to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt).
132
 Browning v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (conviction for rape can rest solely on 
uncorroborated testimony of victim).
133
 State v. Knox, 536 N.W.2d 735 (Iowa 1995) (law has abandoned notion that rape victim’s accusation 
must be corroborated).
134
 State v. Zornes, 774 So.2d 1062 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to establish 
elements of offense).
135
 In Maine, uncorroborated testimony will be scrutinized more carefully, however, corroboration is not 
required.  In State v. Palmer, 624 A.2d 469 (Me. 1993) (corroboration beyond testimony of prosecutrix is 
not required to prove crime of rape); State v. Field, 170 A.2d 167 (Me. 1961) (in absence of corroboration 
testimony must be scrutinized and analyzed with great care – if the testimony is contradictory, 
unreasonable or incredible, it is not sufficient).
136
 Moore v. State, 329 A.2d 48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (victim’s testimony standing alone, if believed, 
is sufficient to sustain conviction).
137
 State v. Gomes, 930 P.2d 701 (Nev. 1996) (sexual assault victim’s uncorroborated testimony is 
sufficient to convict).
138
 State v. Garcia, 199 A.2d 860, 862 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964) (“It is clear that in our jurisdiction a 
conviction for a morals or sex offense may be sustained on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim”) 
(citing State v. Fleckenstein, 159 A.2d 411, 414 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960)).
139
 State v. Henderson, 2003 WL 138272 (N.C. App. Jan. 21, 2003) (“[T]he law does not required medical 
evidence to corroborate a victim’s story as the victim’s word alone is sufficient evidence upon which a jury 
can convict.”);  State v. Rogers, 366 S.E.2d 474 (1988)  (same).
140
 State v. Kringstad, 353 N.W.2d 302, 306 (N.D. 1984) (stating general rule and finding uncorroborated 
testimony of victim had established all of elements of gross sexual imposition).
141
 State v. Fitzmaurice, 475 P.2d 426 (Or. App. 1970) (holding that rape conviction may be had on 
uncorroborated testimony of prosecutrix); State v. Morrow, 75 P.2d 737 (Or., 1938) (stating that, in 
prosecution for rape corroboration is not required).
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Tennessee,142 Utah,143 and Virginia144—allow a defendant to be convicted of rape based 
on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant.  Twelve states and the District of 
Columbia appear to qualify a general rule that no corroboration is required.145  For 
example, in Alaska, when a complainant of sexual abuse later recants her allegation, the 
state must produce corroborating evidence to support the original allegation.146  In 
Arizona, corroboration may be needed when the witness’ story is physically impossible 
or incredible.147  Oklahoma and West Virginia require corroboration only when the 
complainant’s testimony is inherently improbable.148  In Kansas and Kentucky, the 
complainant’s testimony need not be corroborated if it is clear and convincing and not 
unbelievable.149  In Mississippi,150 Missouri,151 Montana,152 and the District of 
142
 Montgomery v. State, 556 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977) (“The rape statute . . . does not 
require that the testimony of the violated female be corroborated.”).  
143
 State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah 1987) (declining to adopt position that testimony of rape 
victim alone cannot support a conviction).
144
 Moore v. Com., 491 S.E.2d 739 (Va. 1997) (stating that conviction of rape may be sustained solely upon 
victim’s testimony).
145
 Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Oklahoma, West Virginia, Wisconsin.  See citations in next notes.
146 See Henry v. State, 861 P.2d 582 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (when victim of sexual abuse recants 
allegation, state must show corroborating evidence to support prior allegations); Brower v. State, 728 P.2d 
645 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (conviction can only be based on complaining witness’ prior inconsistent 
statements only if corroborating evidence existed).
In Massachusetts, corroborative evidence is required to support a prior inconsistent statement.  See
Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 740 N.E.2d 602 (Mass. 2000) (corroborative evidence required when there is 
“prior inconsistent Grand Jury testimony that contains an essential element of the crime”).
147
 State v. Williams, 526 P.2d 714 (Ariz. 1974) (conviction may be had on basis of uncorroborated 
testimony of prosecutrix unless story is physically impossible or so incredible that no reasonable person 
could believe it).
148
 Remine v. State, 759 P.2d 230, 232 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (corroboration of the victim’s testimony is 
“only necessary when [the] prosecutrix’s testimony is too inherently improbable to support a conviction”).  
State v. McPherson, 371 S.E.2d 333, 337 (W. Va. 1988) (allowing sex offense convictions to rest 
solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim, unless the testimony is “inherently incredible”).  West 
Virginia also allows the court to give a cautionary instruction when testimony is uncorroborated.   See State 
v. McPherson, 371 S.E.2d 333, 337 (W. Va. 1988).  
149
 State v. Borthwick, 880 P.2d 1261 (Kan. 1994) (testimony of prosecutrix alone could be sufficient to 
sustain rape conviction without further corroboration as long as it is clear and convincing); State v. 
Mitchell, 771 P.2d 73 (Kan. 1989) (when uncorroborated  testimony of prosecutrix is unbelievable, 
testimony alone is insufficient to sustain rape conviction); State v. Matlock, 660 P.2d 945 (Kan. 1983) 
(conviction of rape can be upheld without corroboration as long as there is clear and convincing evidence 
and as long as testimony is not so incredible and improbable as to defy belief); Carrier v. Commonwealth, 
356 S.W.2d 752 (Ken. 1962) (stating that uncorroborated testimony of prosecutrix may be sufficient to 
sustain conviction if proof is clear and convincing, but insufficient if prosecutrix’s story is intrinsically 
improbable or her actions before and after alleged offense indicate that offense did not happen).
150
 Williams v. State, 757 So.2d 953 (Miss. 1999) (stating that unsupported word of victim of sex crime is 
sufficient to support a guilty verdict where that testimony is not discredited or contradicted by other 
credible evidence).
151
 State v. Gilyard, 979 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1998) (corroborative evidence can be highly probative of victim 
credibility and may even be essential, such as where victim’s testimony is unconvincing or contradictory).
152
 State v. Olson, 951 P.2d 571, 576-77 (Mont. 1997) (reversing previous case law insofar as cases 
required victim’s testimony be consistent with other evidence to support a conviction of sexual assault); 
(State v. Howie, 744 P.2d 156, 159 (Mont. 1987) (“Conviction of a sexual assault may be based entirely on 
the uncorroborated testimony of the victim.”).
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Columbia,153 corroboration is not required except to explain inconsistencies within the 
complainant’s testimony.  Wisconsin requires corroboration when the complainant’s 
testimony is unreliable.154
Like the prompt complaint requirement and the corroboration requirement, 
cautionary instructions have also greatly waned in formal rape law.155 Cautionary 
instructions for rape are prohibited in more than half of the states.  Codes in seven states 
prohibit the judge from issuing jury instructions that the complainant’s testimony should 
be reviewed with special caution given the nature of sexual crimes.156  In addition, a 
153
 Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211 (D.C. 1993) (recognizing that corroboration requirement has been 
abolished but that corroboration might still be necessary, not to ascertain truth of statement but to explain 
inconsistencies).
154 See Thomas v. State, 284 N.W.2d 917, 924 (Wis. 1979) (stating victim’s testimony was unreliable 
because she “stated that she did not remember the incident of sexual intercourse and only testified as to 
what she had been told to say”).  (“[T]his court has held that ‘. . . [w]here the testimony of the prosecuting 
witness bears upon its face evidence of its unreliability, to sustain a conviction there should be 
corroboration by other evidence as to the principal facts relied on to constitute the crime.’”).
155
 Cautionary instructions are regularly employed for the testimony of accomplices, individuals who are or 
could have been indicted for the same crime as the defendant, arising out of the same events, who testify 
against the defendant in return for immunity or a lesser charge against them.  Christine J. Saverda, Note, 
Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for Increased Evidentiary Standards, 100 YALE L.J. 785, 786 
(1990).  Unlike rape victims, accomplices as a routine matter may have self-interested motives for lying or 
exaggerating on the witness stand.  In Hawaii, the cautionary instruction for accomplice testimony reads:
The testimony of an alleged accomplice should be examined and weighed by you with 
greater care and caution than the testimony of ordinary witnesses.  You should decide 
whether the witness’s testimony has been affected by the witness’s interest in the 
outcome of the case, or by prejudice against the defendant, or by the benefits that the 
witness stands to receive because of his/her testimony, or by the witness’s fear of 
retaliation from the government.
Hawaii Criminal Jury Instructions 6.01(A).  In Oklahoma, the accomplice cautionary instruction 
states: “No person may be convicted on the testimony of an accomplice unless the testimony of 
such a witness is corroborated by other evidence.”  Vernon’s Okla. Forms 2d, OUJI-CR 9-25.  See 
also Colo. Jury Instr.. Criminal 4:06, CO-JICRIM 4:06; 10 Minn. Prac. Jury Instr. Guides –
Criminal CRIMJIG 3.18 (4th ed.).
Cautionary instructions have sometimes been issued with child and alibi witnesses.  See, e.g.,
Carol J. Miller, Annotation, Instructions to Jury as to Credibility of Child’s Testimony in Criminal Case, 32 
A.L.R.4th 1196 (2003); Frank D. Wagner, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Instructions on 
Credibility of Alibi Witnesses, 72 A.L.R.3d 617 (2003).
156 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-408 (West 2002) (“In any criminal prosecution [for a sexual offense], or 
for attempt or conspiracy to commit any [sexual offense crime], the jury shall not be instructed to examine 
with caution the testimony of the victim solely because of the nature of the charge, nor shall the jury be 
instructed that such a charge is easy to make but difficult to defend against, nor shall any similar instruction 
be given.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.6 West 2002 (stating that no instruction is permitted that tells jury to 
use different standard for victim’s testimony than that of another witness to that offense or another 
offense); MD. CRIM. LAW § 3-320 (West 2002) (prohibiting jury instruction telling jury to examine 
victim’s testimony with caution solely because of nature of charge); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.347 (5)(d)
(West 2002) amended by 2002 MINN. SESS. LAW. SERV. CH. 381 (S.B. 2433) (West) (prohibiting 
instruction for jury to scrutinize victim’s testimony more closely than in other prosecutions); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 175.186(2) (Michie 2002) (prohibiting instruction that states that rape is difficult to prove or 
establish beyond a reasonable doubt); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3106 (West) (“The credibility of a 
complainant of an offense under this chapter shall be determined by the same standard as is the credibility 
of a complainant of any other crime.  The testimony of a complainant need not be corroborated in 
prosecutions [for sexual offenses].  No instructions shall be given cautioning the jury to view the 
complainant’s testimony in any other way than that in which all complainants’ testimony is viewed.”); S.D. 
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Florida statute generally prohibits judges from commenting to the jury on the credibility 
of witnesses, which has been applied in rape cases to reject cautionary instructions.157
Cautionary instructions in rape cases have also been prohibited by case law in the District 
of Columbia158 and twenty other states—Alaska,159 Arizona,160 California,161 Florida,162
Georgia,163 Idaho,164 Indiana,165 Iowa,166 Louisiana,167 Missouri,168 Montana,169
Nevada,170 North Dakota,171 Ohio,172 Oregon,173 Rhode Island,174 Utah,175 Virginia,176
Washington,177 and Wyoming.178
The remaining thirteen states do not always require cautionary instructions but 
have not prohibited them.179  For example, Nebraska courts have ruled that it was not 
error to refuse to issue the traditional cautionary instruction when an instruction 
emphasizing “the grave importance of its fact-finding function in the administration of 
justice” was given.180  Texas has not prohibited cautionary instructions, but there is no 
rule requiring them.181  The courts of Arkansas,182 Connecticut183 and Mississippi184
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-22-15.1 (Michie) (“The testimony of the complaining witness in a trial for a charge 
of rape shall not, merely because of the nature of that charge, be treated in any different manner than the 
testimony of a complaining witness in any other criminal case.”). 
157 See FLA. STAT. § 90.106 (2000); Marr v. State, 470 So.2d 703 (Fla. Ct. App. 1985).
158 See Arnold v. United States, 358 A.2d 335 (D.C. Ct. App. 1976).
159 See Burke v. State, 624 P.2d 1240 (Alaska 1980)
160 See State v. Settle, 531 P.2d 151 (Ariz. 1975).
161 See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1975).
162 See Marr v. State, 494 So.2d 1139, 1140 (Fla. 1986).
163 See Black v. State, 47 S.E. 370, 371-72 (Ga. 1904).
164 See State v. Smoot, 590 P.2d 1001 (Idaho 1978).
165 See Taylor v. State, 278 N.E.2d 273 (Ind. 1972).
166 See State v. Fedderson, 230 N.W.2d 510, 514 (Iowa 1975).
167 See State v. Selman, 300 So.2d 467, 470 (La. 1974).
168 See State v. Dalrymple, 270 S.W. 675, 679 (Mo. 1925).
169 See State v. Liddell, 685 P.2d 918, 922 (Mont. 1984).
170 See Turner v. State, 892 P.2d 579 (Nev. 1995).
171 See State v. Gross, 351 N.W.2d 428, 434 (N.D. 1984).
172 See State v. Tuttle, 66 N.E. 524, 526 (Ohio 1903).
173 See State v. Bashaw, 672 P.2d 48 (Or. 1983).
174 See State v. Farlett, 490 A.2d 52 (R.I. 1985).
175 See State v. Studham, 572 P.2d 700 (Utah 1977).
176 See Crump v. Commonwealth, 23 S.E. 760, 761 (Va. 1895).
177 See State v. Wilder, 486 P.2d 319 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
178 See Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020, 1044-46 (Wyo. 1986).
179 See Morris, supra note 73, at 156.
180
 In State v. Vicars, rather than instructing specifically for rape, the jury instruction stated: “Consider the 
importance of your function as jurors.  You are the sole judges of the facts.  Your decision on these facts is 
final.  Thus, your position is of grave importance in the proper functioning of the court in the 
administration of justice.  Your primary desire must be to reach a fair and just conclusion only from facts 
and circumstances in evidence.  A consideration of facts and circumstances in evidence excludes sympathy 
or prejudice in reaching a conclusion.” Oklahoma courts have also been unwilling to mandate cautionary 
instructions, especially when testimony is corroborated, although they have not completely banned them.  
See Maxwell v. State, 148 P.2d 214 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1944).  A Tennessee appellate court likewise 
upheld the trial court’s rejection of an instruction that both explained that rape is “hard to disprove” and 
generally disparaged the complainant’s testimony.  See State v. Holcumb, 643 S.W.2d 336, 343 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1982).
181 See Hamilton v. State, 58 S.W. 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 1900) (“[W]e know of no rule that requires the 
judge to so instruct them.”). 
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retain the discretion to use cautionary instructions in rape cases.  In eight other states—
Delaware,185 Hawaii,186 Kansas,187 Maine,188 New Hampshire,189 New Mexico,190 West 
Virginia,191 and Wisconsin192—although corroboration is not required, some courts have 
issued cautionary jury instructions in rape cases.  
The formal prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and 
cautionary instructions in the criminal law of rape have been rejected in most 
jurisdictions.  There are good reasons that states have repudiated these doctrines, for each 
is based on faulty assumptions.
II. The Faulty Assumptions Behind the Prompt Complaint Requirement, 
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions 
One obvious problem with the prompt complaint requirement, corroboration 
requirement, and cautionary instructions in rape law is that they will not thwart a shrewd 
manipulator.  Take Potiphar’s wife, for example.  She made a point of promptly 
complaining.  After Joseph rejected her sexual advances, she immediately called the men 
of her house together and claimed, “See, he came in unto me to lie with me, and I cried 
with a loud voice.”193  Potiphar’s wife gathered corroborative evidence for her false 
claim.  She produced the garment Joseph shed to flee her clutches and capitalized on that 
182 See Beasley v. State, 522 S.W.2d 365, 368 (Ark. 1975) (“While this instruction could have been given, 
the refusal is not grounds for reversal.  We have held that a trial court’s refusal to give a cautionary 
instruction is not reversible error, this being discretionary, unless an abuse of discretion is shown.”).
183 See Arabian, supra note 75, at 613 (citing State v. Braundeis, 79 A. 70 (Conn. 1911).
184 See Watkins v. State, 98 So. 537, 538-39 (Miss. 1923).  In the case law of Alabama, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Michigan, and South Carolina the theory behind the cautionary instruction is mentioned briefly; however, 
its use is not discussed.  See Barnett v. State, 3 So. 612, 615 (Ala. 1887); People v. Appleby, 244 N.E.2d 
395, 398 ( Ill. App. 1968); Holland v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954); People 
v. Jordan, 178 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Mich. App. 1970); State v. Floyd, 177 S.E. 375, 385-86 (S.C. 1934).
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, and Vermont make no mention of the 
cautionary instruction; however, these states do not explicitly prohibit its use.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mayfield, 500 N.E.2d 774 (Mass. 1986); Arabian, supra note 75, at 612-614.
185 See Thompson v. State, 399 A.2d 194, 197-98 (Del. 1979) (holding that, because there was evidence 
that corroborated complainant’s testimony and there was no conflict in evidence to cast doubt on her 
credibility, trial court was not required to give cautionary instruction).  
186 See State v. Dizon, 390 P.2d 759,770 (Haw. 1964) (cautionary instruction may be given when 
complainant did not have corroborating evidence of rape).
187 See State v. Loomer, 184 P. 723, 724 (Kan. 1919) (“No case has even gone to the jury upon the sole 
testimony of the prosecutrix, unsustained by facts and circumstances corroborating it, without the court 
warning them of the danger of a conviction on such testimony”).
188 See State v. McFarland, 369 A.2d 227, 230 (Me. 1977) (cautionary instruction is given for jury to 
scrutinize  victims’ testimony with greater care when there is no corroboration).
189 See State v. Blake, 305 A.2d 300, 305-06 (N.H. 1973) (cautionary instruction appropriate for jury to 
know weight to be given to uncorroborated testimony).
190 See State v. Dodson, 353 P.2d 364, 365-66 (N.M. 1960), State v. Clevenger, 202 P. 687, 689-90 (N.M. 
1921).
191 See State v. McPherson, 371 S.E.2d 333, 337 (W.Va. 1988) (affirming trial judge’s decision to deny 
motion for acquittal and issue cautionary jury instruction stating that complainant’s testimony was subject 
to closer scrutiny to determine whether it was credible because it was uncorroborated).
192 See Conners v. State, 2 N.W. 1143, 1146-47 (Wis. 1879), Abaly v. State, 158 N.W. 308,  309-10 (Wis. 
1916), Cobb v. State, 211 N.W. 785, 789-90 (Wis. 1927).
193 Genesis 39:14 (King James). 
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evidence, claiming to the assembled crowd, “And when he heard that I lifted up my voice 
and cried, he left his garment with me, and fled.”194  Finally, even if someone had 
cautioned Potiphar of the risk of a wrongful conviction, he would probably have thrown 
Joseph in prison anyway.
Independent of their ineffectiveness at stopping false rape complaints, the prompt 
complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions are based 
on a series of false assumptions.  The prompt complaint rule assumes that, if a woman 
were really raped, she would promptly complain to authorities, and that the failure to 
promptly complain to authorities means that she was not really raped.195  As Wigmore 
surmised:
It was entirely natural, after becoming a victim of assault against her will, 
that she should have spoken out.  That she did not, that she went about as 
if nothing had happened, was in effect an assertion that nothing violent 
had been done.196
The reality of victims’ experiences, however, is quite different.  Most rape victims 
do not promptly report the crimes they suffer to police or other authorities.  In fact, most 
do not ever report.  According to the 1992-2000 Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National 
Crime Victimization Survey, 63 percent of rapes, 65 percent of attempted rapes, and 74 
percent of sexual assaults were not reported to the police.197  A 1997 Bureau of Justice 
Statistics random sample survey of 4,446 college-aged women found that, although about 
one in ten had been raped and another one in ten had experienced an attempted rape, 
fewer than five percent reported their rapes or attempted rapes to police or other campus 
authorities.198  Of those rape victims who do tell police or other authorities of having 
194 Genesis 39:15 (King James).  
195 See Torrey, supra note 18, at 1042.  
196 WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 219.
197 RENNISON, supra note 4, at 2.  Sexual assault likely refers to non-penetrative sexual contact.  SEE 
BONNIE S. FISCHER, FRANCIS T. CULLEN, & MICHAEL G. TURNER, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE 
SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE WOMEN 17, 23-24 (2000).
198 FISHCHER, CULLEN & TURNER, supra note 197, at 23.  The survey used detailed, graphic, behaviorally 
specific screen questions to eliminate the ambiguity of asking the respondent if she had been raped.  Id. at
5.  A different study found that 6 percent of first-year female students experienced a sexual assault by 
force; 12 percent experienced a sexual assault involving alcohol; 15 percent experienced a sexual assault by 
either force or alcohol; 16 percent experienced sexual intercourse under psychological pressure; 20 percent 
experienced any nonconsensual sexual penetration; and 9 percent experienced attempted forceful sexual 
assault.  Colleen Finley & Eric Corty, Rape on Campus: The Prevalence of Sexual Assault While Enrolled 
in College, 34 J.C. STUDENT DEV. 113, 114 (1993).  Other studies have obtained comparable results.  For 
example, a 1993 survey of 3,472 undergraduate and graduate students from 12 schools indicated that 8 
percent of women had been raped and 22 percent had been sexually assaulted.  Bonnie S. Fischer, John J. 
Sloan, Francis T. Cullen & Chunmeng Lu, Crime in the Ivory Tower: The Level and Sources of Student 
Victimization, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 671, 683, 691 at Table 1 (1998).
The Bureau of Justice Statistics notes, “The closer the relationship between the female victim and 
the offender, the greater the likelihood that the police would not be told about the rape or sexual assault.” 
RENNISON, supra note 1, at 3.  Given the inverse relationship between intimacy and likelihood of reporting, 
it is significant that the vast majority of rapes involve an intimate partner, relative, or acquaintance of the 
victim.  Intimate partners (which include current and former spouses, cohabiting partners, boyfriends, and 
dates) comprise 62 percent of the perpetrators against adult female rape victims.  PATRICIA TJADEN & 
NANCY THOENNES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND 
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been sexually attacked, a substantial percentage delays reporting for a period of time.199
Most women who are raped, therefore, do not promptly complain.      
The corroboration requirement assumes that, if a woman were really raped, she 
would have corroborative evidence of the assault, and that her failure to produce 
corroboration means that she was not really raped.  Again, the reality of rape victims’ 
experiences is quite different.  Corroboration in a rape case usually refers to physical 
injuries from the assault, torn clothing, or other evidence of a physical struggle.200
Contrary to popular belief, however, non-genital, physical injury from rape is 
uncommon.201  The Department of Justice studied victims admitted to hospital emergency 
rooms for rape, a population that one would assume suffers from more serious and 
numerous physical injuries than victims not admitted to emergency rooms post-rape. 
Sixty-eight percent of these admitted emergency room rape victims suffered no non-
genital physical injuries, just 26 percent suffered mild non-genital physical injuries, only 
5 percent suffered moderate non-genital physical injuries, and just .02 percent suffered 
severe non-genital physical injuries.202  Even genital physical injuries are rare.  Most rape 
victims do not suffer the kind of genital trauma that is detectable by hospital staff.203
The other type of corroborative evidence frequently thought valid is torn clothes 
or other evidence of a serious physical battle between the assailant and the victim.  The 
reality, however, is that most rapes do not involve a fight that would produce this kind of 
evidence.204  Most rapists, particularly acquaintance rapists, are able to subdue their 
victims with verbal coercion and pinning and need not resort to overt physical 
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 44 exh.22 (2000).  Other relatives and acquaintances 
comprise another 28 percent of perpetrators.  Id.  Thus, only 17 percent of perpetrators are strangers to their 
victims.  Id.
199
 Of the rape victims who reported their attacks to the police, 25 percent delayed reporting more than 24 
hours. NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER, RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 5-6 tbl.7 (1992).  Studies 
indicate that the greater the prior intimacy between the victim and the attacker, the longer the delay in 
reporting.  Aviva Orenstein, “MY GOD!”: A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance Exception to the 
Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 201 n.158 (1997).  Victims who do not report or who delay reporting 
choose to do so because they fear that no one will believe them, or they may harbor tremendous feelings of 
embarrassment or guilt about the incident.  See RENNISON, supra note 4, at 3.
200 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 483.  (“When therefore a virgin has been so deflowered and overpowered 
against the peace of the lord the King, forthwith and whilst the act is fresh, she ought repair with hue and 
cry to the neighboring vills, and there display to honest men the injury done to her, the blood and her dress 
stained with blood, and the tearing of her dress”).
201 LINDA E. LEDRAY, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT NURSE EXAMINER SANE DEVELOPMENT AND 
OPERATION GUIDE 69 (1999).  See also HEATHER KARJANE ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 
CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT: HOW AMERICA’S INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION RESPOND 72 (2002).
202 LEDRAY, supra note 203, at 69, 70.  Another Bureau of Justice Statistics study indicated that only 38 
percent of female rape victims who sought treatment from a hospital emergency room post-rape suffered 
from extrinsic physical injury:  33 percent suffered minor injuries, and 5 percent suffered serious injury.  
See RENNISON, supra note 4, at 2.  These findings are consistent with the findings of injuries among all 
reported and unreported rape victims from 1992 to 2000 of females over the age of 12.  Id. at 1.
203 LEDRAY, supra note 202, at 70.  One study showed that only 19 percent of the victims had vaginal 
injuries and these injuries were always accompanied by the victim complaining of related pain, discomfort 
or bleeding.  Id.  Two other studies found that 22 out of 83 (27 percent) of rape victims had genital injuries 
and the second study found that only 1 percent of rape victims had genital injuries that required surgery for 
repair.  Id.
204
 Anderson, Reviving Resistance, supra note 37, at 999.  See also Hunter, supra note 37, at 127.
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violence.205  Additionally, some women become frozen with fear once an attack begins, 
which prevents them from physically resisting their assailants.206
Cautionary instructions for juries in rape cases assume that jurors are ordinarily 
biased in favor of an alleged rape victim and so should be cautioned against this natural 
inclination.  As Hale explained, in rape cases, “the heinousness of the offense many 
times” transports the judge and jury to hastily convict.207  Given our country’s racial 
history after the Civil War in which whites used rape allegations to terrorize the black 
community and inspire lynchings, Hale’s admonition may be relevant to black on white 
stranger rapes today.208  In those relatively rare circumstances, it is quite possible that the 
judge and jury may be transported to hastily convict.  In most rape cases—which are 
intra-racial and committed by acquaintances—however, social science literature 
documents quite the opposite.  Studies indicate that jurors go out of their way to 
scrutinize the victim’s behavior and use it to excuse the defendant’s behavior.  The 
cautionary instructions both derive from and exacerbate this expansive societal prejudice 
against rape victims.
It has become a cliché to say that the legal proceedings in a rape case (and the 
media circus that occasionally accompanies them) put the victim on trial.209  However, 
this notion is more real than rhetorical.  Juries are hyper-critical of a victim’s behavior 
and tend to blame her for the rape itself.210  Studies indicate that the outcome of an 
205 See infra notes 377-379 and accompanying text.
206
 Anderson, Reviving Resistance, supra note 37, at 994 n.260.
207 HALE, supra note 14, at 636.
208
 The period of Reconstruction after the Civil War in the United States brought with it decades of terror 
lodged against the black community by white southerners who sought to re-impose slavery.  A central 
mechanism of the terror campaign was lynching.  Between 1889 and 1940, at least 3,800 blacks were 
lynched in former Confederate and bordering states.  JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE 
MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 216 (1988).  Lynching was justified by a belief that the 
“honor and sanctity of white womanhood” needed to be protected from the black rapist.  W. FITZHUGH 
BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH 58 (1993).  Despite this justification, most lynchings had little 
to do with rape.  D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra, at 217.  Between 1882 and 1946, just 23 percent of 
lynching victims were accused of rape or attempted rape.  BETTINA APTHEKER, WOMAN’S LEGACY 61
(1982).  See also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, THIRTY YEARS 
OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES 1889-1918 10 (1919).  In those few cases in which a lynch mob did 
charge rape, these allegations had a variety of sources.  Sometimes they rested on nothing more than a 
black man entering the room of a white woman or brushing against her; in other cases, there was evidence 
of an actual attack.  Id. at 10.  Other times alleged rapes were interracial love affairs detected by the white 
community.  SANDRA GUNNING, RACE, RAPE, & LYNCHING 27 (1996).  Moreover, sometimes whites used 
the accusation of a rape as mechanism to seek revenge.  BRUNDAGE, supra, at 62.  For example, two black 
farmhands, Albert Royal and Charlie Jackson, were in a dispute with white planters over some debts.  One 
of the planters falsely accused Jackson of an assault of a white woman.  He was arrested, but the lie was 
exposed and Jackson was released.  After his release, a small group of white men rounded up Royal and 
Jackson, tied them to a tree and shot them to death.  Id. at 62, 63.
209 JULIE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE THE MISUNDERSTOOD CRIME 174 (1993) (“It is 
not an exaggeration to say that in the minds of each of the legal system’s operative- the prosecuting 
attorney, the defense attorney, the judge and the jury—the victim is on trial.”).  See also LEE MADIGAN & 
NANCY C. GAMBLE, THE SECOND RAPE: SOCIETY’S CONTINUED BETRAYAL OF THE VICTIM 102 (1989); 
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF THE LAW
(1998), ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 6 (1999); Anderson, From 
Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License, supra note 37, at 60.
210
 One reason jurors blame the victim and immunize her assailant from punishment is to preserve the 
comforting but imaginary notion of a “just world.”  Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and 
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average rape trial has more to do with the jury’s assessment of the complainant’s guilt 
than it has to do with its assessment of the defendant’s guilt.211
A complainant’s perceived promiscuity,212 less-than-chaste clothing style,213 and 
failure to conform to gender norms negatively affect jurors’ assessment of whether a rape 
has occurred.214  Any victim behavior that increases the risk for sexual assault (from 
hitchhiking to dating to just talking to a man at a party) leads to leniency with the 
defendant.215  As one study concluded:  
Any evidence of [the victim’s] drinking, drug use, or sexual activity 
outside of marriage led jurors to doubt defendants’ guilt, as did any prior 
acquaintance between victim and defendant.  In fact . . . measures of 
victims’ gender-role behavior were more important than measures of 
physical evidence and seriousness of offense in predicting jurors’ case 
evaluations.216
Jurors thus often blur the distinction between a complainant’s behavior that may increase 
her risk of being raped with a justification for the rape itself.217  In rape cases, juries 
frequently make a victim’s negligence tantamount to her consent to the sex alleged to 
Rape: The Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 
MINN. L. REV. 395, 409 (1985).  People want to believe that the world is predictable and operates 
according to a set of rules and that people deserve what they get.  Karen S. Calhoun & Ruth M. Townsley, 
Attributions of Responsibility for Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE THE HIDDEN CRIME 61 
(Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer ed., 1991).
211
 Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License, supra note 37, at 249.
212
 In a 1982 study in which mock jurors heard identical rape scenarios except that (1) the victim was 
promiscuous; or (2) the victim was sexually inexperienced; or (3) nothing about the victim’s past sexual 
history was told, the jurors rated the rape as “most serious when the victim’s past was not mentioned, less 
serious if she had limited experience, and least serious when she was promiscuous.”  Id. at 104-105 (citing 
study).
213
 In a 1999 study, college students were more likely to blame the victim, consider the rapist justified, and 
label the attack something less than rape when the victim in the rape scenario wore a shorter skirt.  Id. at 
141 (citing study).  A 1991 survey of 500 Americans found that 53 percent of adults over the age of 50 and 
31 percent of adults between the age of 35 and 50 believe that a woman is responsible for her rape if she 
dresses provocatively.  Id. at n.572 (citing study).
214 See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3 at 251 (explaining that juries are more likely to acquit defendant of 
rape if victim engaged in certain behaviors, such as prior sexual relations with defendant, prostitution, or 
having illegitimate children); LAFREE, supra note 3, at 217-218 (explaining that juries were less likely to 
convict defendant of rape if victim engaged in such non-gender-conforming behavior as leaving home 
without male, hitchhiking, walking outside alone, engaging in sex outside of marriage, working in 
“disreputable occupations” (such as being a cocktail waitress), or engaging in traditionally male activities 
such as riding motorcycles or spending time at bars).
215 See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 249.
216 LAFREE, supra note 3, at 226.
217
 Calhoun & Townsley, supra note 210, at 58-60.  No one would suggest acquitting the house thief or the 
mugger because of the simple negligence of these victims.  Id. at 60.  A similar blaming the victim for his 
or her contributory negligence or assumption of the risk was discovered in homicide prosecutions involving 
drag racing accidents or Russian roulette. David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice 
System, 87 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 1298, 1334 (1997).  Perhaps jurors equate courtship to these games 
and the “loser” deserves what they got for playing the game and the victor deserves the spoils of not being 
blamed.
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have been rape.218  Jurors can thereby nullify rape law “by importing the tort concept of 
contributory negligence or assumption of risk into the criminal case, acquitting the 
defendant when they believe that the victim behaved carelessly.”219  Although neither a 
rape victim’s “contributory negligence” nor her “assumption of the risk” is a defense in 
rape law, jurors employ these doctrines to excuse the defendant’s conduct.220
Cautionary instructions that warn juries to “to evaluate the testimony of a victim 
or complaining witness with special care in view of” her “emotional involvement” in the 
crime221 do not mitigate societal bias in favor of rape complainants. Instead, such 
cautionary instructions aggravate substantial societal bias against rape complainants.  
They are both an expression of and an exacerbating factor in that widespread bias. 
The modern incarnation of the erroneous notion that women and girls are prone to 
lie about sexual assault derives at least in part from the misogyny Sigmund Freud brought 
to the burgeoning field of psychoanalysis he founded in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries.  Freud asserted that women unconsciously desire sexual assault because they 
are inherently masochistic.222  Courts and legal scholars used the assertions of Freud and 
his contemporaries to support their view that women are apt to fabricate accusations of 
rape.223 Wigmore argued:
Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behavior of errant young 
girls and women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases.  Their 
psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, 
partly by diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by bad 
social environment, partly by temporary physiological or emotional 
conditions.  One form taken by these complexes is that of contriving false 
charges of sexual offences by men.  The unchaste (let us call it) mentality 
finds incidental but direct expression in the narration of imaginary sex-
incidents of which the narrator is the heroine or the victim.  On the surface 
the narration is straightforward and convincing.  The real victim, however, 
218
 Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 217, at 1337.
219 Id. at 1333, 1334.  
220
 For example, a victim’s potentially risky behavior may make her rape more likely; however, it does not 
follow that the defendant should not be blamed for his own behavior.  Calhoun & Townsley, supra note 
210, at 60.
221 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4).
222 SIGMUND FREUD, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE chap. 8, n.7 (Trans. A. A. Brill, 1901) (“The 
case [of suicide] is then identical with a sexual attack on a woman, in whom the attack of the man cannot 
be warded off through the full muscular strength of the woman because a portion of the unconscious 
feelings of the one attacked meets it with ready acceptance”).  See also 1 H. D EUTSCH, THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF WOMEN 274 (1944) (proposing theory that women fantasize rape because of “penis envy” and female 
attraction to suffering).
223 JULIE A. ALLISON & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, RAPE THE MISUNDERSTOOD CRIME 207 (1993).  See, 
e.g., Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1137 (1967) (“Surely the simplest, and 
perhaps the most important reason not to permit conviction for rape on the uncorroborated word of the 
prosecutrix is that that word is very often false”); Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the 
Operation of Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE. L.J. 55, 67 (1952) (“a woman’s need for sexual 
satisfaction may lead to the unconscious desire for forceful penetration, the coercion serving neatly to avoid 
the guilt feelings which might arise after willing participation”).  The psychological literature asserting that 
women want to be violently sexually possessed is summarized in MENACHEM AMIR, PATTERN OF FORCIBLE 
RAPE 253-57 (1971).
33
too often in such cases is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy 
naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy 
credit to such a plausible tale.224
The fields of psychology and psychiatry have since rejected Wigmore and Freud’s 
argument that the female psyche is inherently defective.225
To be sure, there are personality disorders that might lead a man or woman to lie 
in any number of outrageous ways, including lodging a false report of a crime.226  There 
is, however, no specific empirical research connecting any of these personality disorders 
with false complaints of rape to the police.  In fact, there is no good empirical data on 
false rape complaints either historically or currently.  A debate over the number of false 
complaints nevertheless continues.  
One side of the debate maintains that only two percent of rape complaints made to 
the police are false.227  In her popular 1975 book on rape, Against Our Will, Susan 
Brownmiller wrote, “When New York City instituted a special sex crimes analysis squad 
and put police women (instead of men) in charge of interviewing complaints, the number 
of false charges in New York dropped dramatically to 2 percent, a figure that corresponds 
224 WIGMORE, supra note 3, at 459.  Wigmore’s suggestion for cautioning juries about the threat of a false 
accusation was: “No judge should ever let a sex-offence charge go to the jury unless the female 
complainant’s social history and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified 
physician.”  Id. at 460.
225 See generally MILTON BERGER, WOMEN BEYOND FREUD: NEW CONCEPTS OF FEMININE PSYCHOLOGY
(1994); NANCY CHODOROW, FREUD ON WOMEN (1992); EDWARD TIMMS & NAOMI SEGAL, FREUD AND 
THE QUESTION OF WOMEN (1988); ELI SAGAN, FREUD, WOMEN AND MORALITY: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
GOOD AND EVIL (1988); JEFFERY MOUSSAIEFF MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH: FREUD’S SUPPRESSION 
OF THE SEDUCTION THEORY (1984).
226
 Antisocial, borderline, histrionic, narcissistic, and compulsive personalities have all been associated with 
lying.  See Charles Ford et al., Lies and Liars: Psychiatric Aspects of Prevarication, 145 AMER. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 554 (1988).  Antisocial Personality Disorder, in particular, may cause one to lie chronically.  
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
702 (4th ed. 2000).  This disorder is characterized by a pattern of irresponsible and antisocial behavior that 
may include repeated lying, using aliases, or conning others.  Id.  It may also include being promiscuous 
and cheating, stealing, or engaging in other criminal behavior.  Id.  About three percent of American males 
have Antisocial Personality Disorder and one percent of females have it.  Id. at 704.  
Individuals with Borderline Personality Disorder have “a pervasive pattern of instability of 
interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects,” coupled with an intense fear of abandonment.  Id. at 
706.  Borderline individuals may engage in pathological lying.  See, e.g., Scott Snyder, Pseudologia 
Fantastica in the Borderline Patient, 143 AMER. J. PSYCHIATRY 1287 (1987).  About two percent of the 
general population is estimated to suffer from Borderline Personality Disorder and it is diagnosed 
predominately in females.  AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra at 708.  
Histrionic Personality Disorder is characterized by “pervasive and excessive emotionality and 
attention-seeking behavior,” and individuals with it “they often act out a role (e.g., ‘victim’ or ‘princess’) in 
their relationships to others.”  Id. at 712.  About two to three percent of people suffer from it, but it is 
unclear whether men or women suffer from it more often because the diagnosis may be influenced by sex-
role stereotyping.  Id. at 712-13.
Someone with Narcissistic Personality Disorder has “a pervasive pattern of grandiosity, need for 
admiration, and lack of empathy.”  Id. at 714.  It appears that more males than females are diagnosed with 
this disorder, which affects less than one percent of the general population.  Id. at 716.
227 ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 209, at 11.  
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exactly to the rate of false reports for other violent crimes.”228  Over time and perhaps 
through repetition,229 this two percent false rate has come to constitute the “conventional 
scholarly wisdom” on the matter.230  The United States Justice Department appears to 
side with this camp, stating, “False accusations of sexual assault are estimated to occur at 
the low rate of two percent—similar to the rate of false accusations for other crimes.”231
The other side of the debate claims that eight percent or more of rape complaints 
made to the police are false, a percentage disproportionate to other crimes.232  The FBI 
Uniform Crime Reports have in the past indicated that, overall, about eight percent of 
forcible rape complaints reported to police are “unfounded;”233 however, “unfounded” 
does not mean false.234  Police may code a case “unfounded” when they conclude that it 
is unverifiable, not serious, or not prosecutable.235  Various factors can increase a city’s 
percentage of “unfounded” rape complaints, such as police incompetence, bias, or 
insensitivity to rape victims.236  The Department of Justice reports:
Some police officers incorrectly think that a rape report is unfounded or 
false if any of the following conditions apply:
—the victim has a prior relationship with the offender 
(including having previously been intimate with him);
—the victim used alcohol or drugs at the time of the 
assault;
228 BROWNMILLER, supra note 18, at 387.  Her figure was based on remarks by a New York Appellate
Division Justice, Lawrence H. Cooke.  Id. at 444.  The 2 percent claim also emerged in a 1979 book.  
SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM 205-214 (1979).  Based on their 
review of the literature, Katz and Mazur concluded that the frequency of false rape reports is probably 
small and the myth that women frequently lie is not accurate.  Id. at 214.  
229
 One law review article footnotes an expansive list of legal scholarship citing the 2 percent claim based 
on Brownmiller or Katz and Mazur or based on other works that cite Brownmiller or Katz and Mazur.  
Edward Greer, The Truth Behind Legal Dominance Feminism’s “Two Percent False Rape Claim” Figure,
33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 947, 949 (2000).  AS Greer points out, “As far as can be ascertained, no study has 
ever been published which sets forth an evidentiary basis for the ‘two percent false rape complaint’ thesis.”  
Id. at 951.
230
 David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L.R. 317, 377 (2000).  He however qualifies his 
statement in its footnote because “[i]t is unclear whether this is true; the subject is more complex than 
scholars usually acknowledge.”  Id. at 377  n.221.
231 OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FIRST RESPONSE TO VICTIMS OF 
CRIME 2001 10 (2001).
232 ALLISON & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 209, at 10-11.
233 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES, 26 (1997), 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES, 24 (1996), 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES, 24 (1995).
The FBI Uniform Crime Reports since 1998 have not mentioned this difference in unfounding 
rates.  See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES
(1998), FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES  (1999), 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (2000), 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES (2001).
234 RANA SAMPSON, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ACQUAINTANCE RAPE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS 9 (2002).
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 Lynn Hecht Schafran, Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 979, 1010 
(1993).
236
 Michelle Anderson, Women Do Not Report the Violence They Suffer: Violence Against Women and the 
State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. REV. 907, 928-931 (2001).
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—there is no visible evidence of injury;
—the victim delays disclosure to the police and/or others 
and does not undergo a rape medical exam; and/or
—the victim fails to immediately label her assault as rape 
and/or blames herself.237
Neither side’s numbers in the debate over false complaints of rape lodged with the police 
appear, therefore, to be supported by the kind of empirical evidence upon which one 
might feel confident.238.  As a scientific matter, the frequency of false rape complaints to 
police or other legal authorities remains unknown.
While there is very little empirical evidence on false rape complaints to the police, 
there are ample data indicating that real rapes remain vastly underreported to the 
police.239  Rape is, in fact, one of the most underreported serious crimes.240  Although 
decades of studies document the great reluctance of true rape victims to report their 
attacks to the police, many continue to fixate on the risk of false rape complainants, a risk 
that does not enjoy empirical support.  
Most rape victims not only do not promptly complain, they do not ever complain 
to police or other legal authorities of having been sexually victimized.  Corroborative 
evidence of sexual assault—such as torn clothes or injuries—is not only uncommon, it is 
downright rare.  Instead of exhibiting a bias in favor of rape victims that jurors need to be 
cautioned against, jurors tend to be biased against rape victims and traditional cautionary 
instructions in rape cases only exacerbate that bias.  Instead of warding off false claims, 
then, these three legal doctrines greatly hinder the prosecution of truthful claims.  
Because they are based on faulty assumptions, the criminal rape law in most jurisdictions 
has formally rejected the prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and 
cautionary instructions.241
237 SAMPSON, supra note 234, at 5.
238
 David Bryden and Sonja Lengnick argue, “Any advantage the woman might derive from a false 
accusation seems to be greatly outweighed by the potential adverse consequences of this type of deceit.” 
Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 217, at 1298.  However, they do not find this argument entirely convincing 
because a false rape charge may provide a “convenient explanation” for an embarrassing affair, a 
pregnancy, or adultery.  Id. at 1299.  Interestingly, they argue that more false rape reports would not 
necessarily mean more innocent men convicted because the false accuser could accomplish her goal by just 
making the claim and not going to trial. Id. at 1313-14.  They conclude that wrongful convictions for rape 
will also be low because of:
The high pre-trial case attrition rate, the skepticism of some police toward acquaintance 
rape accusations, the large numbers of women who eventually decide not to cooperate 
with the prosecution, the reluctance of prosecutors to take on weak cases, and the historic 
reluctance of jurors to convict men charged with acquaintance rape…
Id. at 1314.
239 RENNISON, supra note 4, at 1.  
240
 In 2001, for example, only 39 percent of rapes and sexual assaults were reported, as compared to 61 
percent of robberies and 59 percent of aggravated assaults.  CALLIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 2001 10 (2002).  Most female college students who have an 
experience that meets the legal definition of rape do not even define that experience as rape, and so never 
recount it as such to the authorities.  Fischer, Cullen, & Turner, supra note 197, at 15.
241 See, e.g., State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1990) (noting that prompt complaint requirement “is rooted in 
sexist notions about how the ‘normal’ women responds to rape” and must be rejected in an “attempt to cure 
the defects underlying the rule that could infect rape proceedings with anti-female bias”); MODEL PENAL 
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III. Campus Sexual Assault Policies and Practices
In the early 19th century, the newly created American institutions of higher 
education were rampant with student disorder.242  In general, colleges and universities 
policed crime on campus institutionally rather than referring students to the outside 
criminal justice system.243  After a student riot at Harvard in 1818, for example, John 
Adams suggested flogging to discipline the unruly undergraduates.244  Disavowing 
corporal punishment, Thomas Jefferson established a student government at the 
University of Virginia in the hopes that its undergraduates would thereby control 
themselves.245  Less than a year later, however, campus disorder had only escalated and 
the faculty threatened to resign.246  After a violent altercation involving fourteen students 
and two professors at the University of Virginia, Jefferson dissolved the student 
government and constructed a new disciplinary code.247
Student discipline in the early republic involved only male student behavior 
because women were forbidden from attending college.248  Despite Oberlin’s first foray 
into coeducation at its founding in 1833, women remained but a small minority of the 
collegiate student body through most of the century.249  By the beginning of the 20th
century, however, (and despite the resistance of many prestigious institutions, particularly 
in the Northeast and South) coeducation became the predominant form of higher 
education in America.250 The issue of sexual assault on campus, however, did not arise 
until much later in 20th century.  
During the past few decades, many factors led colleges and universities to change 
their disciplinary codes to address student sexual assault.251  In the 1960s, attitudes 
toward college students changed when states lowered the age of majority and the 26th
CODE  § 213.6(6), 425 (A.L.I. 1980) (“New York’s corroboration requirement was amended substantially in 
1972 and revised completely in 1974” because “it was thought to reflect an official policy of suspicion 
towards female complainants and an overzealous attitude toward protecting male defendants”) (footnotes 
omitted).
242
 Rodney Hessinger, “The Most Powerful Instrument of College Discipline”: Student Disorder and the 
Growth of Meritocracy in the Colleges of the Early Republic, 39 HIST. EDUC. Q. 237, 239 (1999).
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 Michael Griffaton, Note, Forewarned Is Forearmed: The Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 
1990 and the Future of Institutional Liability for Student Victimizations, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 525, 529 
(1993).
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 Hessinger, supra note 242, at 241.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.  Jefferson called the student body before the Board of Visitors to take responsibility for their actions.  
Before Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, and the rest of the Board, Jefferson asked the fourteen 
students responsible for the fight to step forward and was astonished when his nephew did.  Id.
When both corporal punishment and student self-government came to be viewed as incorrect, 
Provost Federic Beasley at the University of Pennsylvania proposed the meritocracy as a way to prevent 
student disorder.  Id. at 250-51.  Competitive grades and class rankings were to convince students to work 
hard to gain their professors’ approval.  Id. at 251.  A new model of academic hierarchy in America was 
born.  Id. at 262.
248
 Rosalind Rosenberg, The Limits of Access: The History of Coeducation in America, in WOMEN AND 
HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 107 (John Mack Faragher & Florence Howe, eds., 1988).
249 Id. at 115.  See also http://www.oberlin.edu/external/EOG/womenshist/women.html.
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 Rosenberg, supra note 248, at 109.
251 BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 35, at 94.
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Amendment reduced the voting age to 18.252  The sexual revolution of the 1960s and 
1970s meant that young adults were more likely to engage in sexual interactions.253
Student curfews were repealed and mixed-sex dorms opened.254  In the 1970s, criminal 
reform of rape law became a central item on the feminist agenda.255  In the 1980s, Dr. 
Mary Koss published a nationwide survey of 6,100 college students on rape, and her 
research sparked widespread interest in campus sexual assault.256  In the 1990s, media 
then became interested in colleges’ disciplinary responses to sexual assault on campus.257
As a result of these changes, colleges and universities have implemented a variety of 
sexual assault codes.  Penalties for violations of these codes can include fines, 
reprimands, negative notations on one’s record, probation, suspension, or expulsion.258
There are a number of reasons a woman raped on campus might choose to avail 
herself of these codes and pursue a campus disciplinary proceeding instead of a criminal 
proceeding against her attacker.  Victims often harbor substantial fear of the publicity and 
emotional trauma attendant to a trial process.259  If a rape victim can obtain some 
recourse at a more local level, she often feels more comfortable pursuing it.260  A victim 
may also simply want to have her attacker suspended or expelled so she does not have to 
face him in calculus class, for instance.  Finally and most importantly, the criminal justice 
system, with its standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, rarely provides 
relief to acquaintance rape victims, so a campus disciplinary proceeding may appear to be 
a more advantageous avenue of potential relief.261  The legacy of the prompt complaint 
requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions as they now affect 
campus sexual assault policies and practices are making disciplinary proceedings less 
advantageous, however.
A. Emergence of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration 
Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions in Campus Sexual Assault 
Policies and Practices
252 Id. at 95.
253 Id. at 96.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 8, Table 1-1.
256 COMMITTEE TO ADDRESS SEXUAL ASSAULT AT HARVARD, supra note 35, at 21.  Despite the criticism it 
has suffered (see, e.g, Neil Gilbert, Advocacy Research Overstates the Incidence of Date and Acquaintance 
Rape, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 120 (Richard Gelles & Donileen Loseke, eds. 
1993)), Mary Koss’ research on sexual assault on campus remains leading in the field.  
257
 Tenerowicz, supra note 32, at 658-59.
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 Swem, supra note 32, at 365.  Expulsion may prevent a student from transferring to another university 
because a transfer student ordinarily must be in good standing at his previous institution. Tenerowicz, supra 
note 32, at 683.
259
 Paul Rosenthal, Note, The Accused Student’s Right To Remain Silent in Public University Disciplinary 
Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1241, 1247-48 (1997).
260 Id. at 1247.
261 ANDREA PARROT & LAURIE BECHOFER, ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN CRIME 125 (1991) (“a 
woman’s not consenting to sex is not enough [for a rape conviction] in the eyes of most jurors, especially if 
the rapist was acquainted with the victim and did not use a weapon.”).  When a complainant does decide to 
pursue criminal charges, often the school will put its disciplinary proceedings in abeyance pending 
resolution of the criminal proceedings.
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In response to the growing concern over sexual assault and rape on campus, a 
disturbing development has emerged at some colleges and universities.  Some institutions 
of higher learning are imposing versions of the ancient corroboration and prompt 
complaint requirements on victims through informal practice and even through formal 
policies laid out in campus disciplinary procedures.  These antiquated tactics, rejected by 
the vast majority of criminal law jurisdictions in the United States decades ago, tend to 
deter sexual assault victims from coming forward and, in those cases that do come to 
light, to resolve them hastily in favor of the accused.
In 1993, the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard College, the undergraduate 
division of Harvard University, adopted a strong statement against sexual misconduct.262
The 1993 statement granted students “the right to bodily safety and integrity” and 
affirmed that the institution was “committed to creating and maintaining an environment” 
in which all individuals “are treated with dignity and feel safe and secure in their 
persons.”263  It said:
In accordance with these principles, the Faculty of Arts and Sciences will 
not tolerate sexual misconduct including rape and sexual assault, whether 
affecting a man or a woman, perpetrated by an acquaintance or a stranger, 
by someone of the same sex or someone of the opposite sex.  Such 
behavior is unacceptable in our community.  A student who commits rape, 
sexual assault, or other sexual misconduct is subject to severe penalties 
under the rules of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences.  Rape and sexual 
assault are serious crimes under the laws of the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts and the individuals responsible for such acts are subject to 
prosecution and legal penalties.
The statement indicated that a victim could “initiate disciplinary or remedial action for 
sexual misconduct, including rape and sexual assault, through Harvard College in 
accordance with the procedures for adjudicating peer disputes.”264  A victim could pursue 
such a disciplinary action at the campus level whether or not she chose to report to the 
local police and pursue the case criminally.265  The 1993 statement was a strong policy in 
favor of victims’ rights.
Nine years later, the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard College adopted a 
new set of procedures for complaints of sexual assault.266  Newspaper reports indicated 
262
 Standards of Conduct in the Harvard Community, Faculty of Arts and Sciences: Student Handbook, ch. 
4, available at http://www.registrar.fas.harvard.edu/handbooks/student.2002-2003/chapter4/conduct.html 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2002).  It was the first time the school implemented such a policy. COMMITTEE TO 
ADDRESS SEXUAL ASSAULT AT HARVARD, supra note 35, at 12.
263 Id.
264 Id.  The 1993 statement noted that being intoxicated was not an excuse or a defense to a sexual offense, 
in that it did “not diminish a student’s responsibility in perpetrating rape, sexual assault, or other sexual 
misconduct.”  Id.
265 Id. 
266 See Office of Civil Rights, Ruling on Title IX Investigation of Harvard’s New Sexual Assault Policy, 2, 
April 1, 2003. [hereinafter OCR Ruling].  The 2002 Procedures indicate:
The Administrative Board of Harvard College has this year adopted a new procedure for 
responding to complaints of peer-on-peer misconduct, including sexual misconduct.  This 
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that a “spike in accusations” of student rape motivated the changes.267  Harvard officials 
indicated that the school disciplinary system failed to reach satisfactory results in these 
recent cases.268  When he recommended the new procedures, Harry Lewis, the Dean of 
Harvard College, said that the Administrative Board at Harvard, the body responsible for 
resolving peer disputes, was not equipped to deal with what he characterized as “he 
said/she said” rape complaints.269
The previous academic year was representative of Harvard’s inadequacy in 
disciplining campus rape.  During the 2000-01 academic term the Administrative Board 
handled seven student complaints of sexual assault.270  In six of the seven cases, the 
Board chose to take no disciplinary action against the accused.  In the one case in which 
the Board did take disciplinary action, the Board found the complainant and the accused 
equally responsible for the assault and required them both to withdraw from the 
college.271
In one of the six cases in which the Board chose to take no disciplinary action, a 
sophomore complained of having been raped in the fall of her first year at Harvard by a 
male student.272  According to the complainant, he sexually assaulted her twice as she 
lapsed in and out of consciousness due to heavy intoxication.  The complainant submitted 
a list of fifteen witnesses to the Administrative Board.  The Board concluded there was 
not enough evidence to resolve the case in the complainant’s favor and so took no 
disciplinary action against the accused.273
Harvard administrators believed that, despite the complainant’s fifteen witnesses, 
this case was emblematic of the so-called “he said/she said” rape complaints that the 
Board did not have the capacity to resolve.274  Harvard administrators did not indicate a 
problem with the disciplinary board itself.  They asserted, instead, that the problem was 
with female students who, they alleged, had “unrealistic expectations” in bringing their 
complaints of having been sexual assaulted to the Administration Board.275
The 2002 Procedures were a way to eliminate those complaints from the Board’s 
docket.  The Procedures said:
procedural change does not alter the College’s policies regarding rape, sexual assault, or 
other sexual misconduct as voted by the Faculty in 1993.
See New Procedure for Peer Disputes: Administrative Board of Harvard College, 2002-2003, available at
http://www.college.harvard.edu/academic/adboard/peer_dispute_procedure.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002) 
[hereinafter New Procedure].
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Because the former boyfriend did not appeal the Board’s decision, he was allowed to promptly reapply to 
Harvard, was re-admitted, and was awarded his degree retroactively.  Because the complainant appealed, 
however, her degree remained “in limbo.”  Id.
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275 Id. See also Zernike, supra note 267, at A36 (“Officials feared that the existing procedures had raised 
expectations [among students]”).
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Complaints must ordinarily be brought to the College in a timely manner.  
The Board typically cannot resolve peer dispute cases in which there is 
little evidence except the conflicting statements of the principals.  
Therefore, the Board ordinarily will not consider a case unless the 
allegations presented by the complaining party are supported by 
independent corroborating evidence.  Based on the information provided 
at the time of the complaint, the Board will decide whether or not there 
appears to be sufficient corroborating evidence to pursue the complaint.276
These new procedures not only implemented an explicit prompt complaint requirement 
and a corroboration requirement under ordinary circumstances, they also implied a 
cautionary rule.  Complaints needed to be “timely,” allegations needed to be supported by 
“sufficient corroborating evidence,” and Harvard cautioned the Board against pursuing 
cases in which the victim had “little evidence” but her own testimony.277
A preliminary investigation would “assess whether the complaint has the potential 
to be resolved through the College’s judicial process.”278  If the Board was “unlikely to 
obtain information beyond students’ conflicting and credible accounts,” the Board might 
“decline to pursue a complaint further.”279  Harvard thereby cautioned officials against 
pursuing grievances in which the complainant’s “credible account” of her sexual abuse 
was the only evidence she had.  
A student grievance would proceed as follows.  First, the complainant would give 
“the College a detailed written statement summarizing his or her complaint along with a 
descriptive list of all sources of information (persons, correspondence, records, actions 
taken, etc.) that may help to corroborate the allegations.”280  The sources of information 
could include “virtually anything that helps to corroborate a student’s account, including, 
for example, diary entries or conversations with roommates or friends; it is not limited to 
eyewitnesses, confessions, or forensic evidence.”281  The accused was then asked to 
“prepare a detailed written statement along with a descriptive list of sources of supporting 
information.”282
The Secretary of the Administrative Board would review “the statements and lists 
of supporting information and collect any other statements or documents that help to 
corroborate the students’ accounts.”283  The Secretary would then present the information 
to the Chair of the Board.  The Chair took one of two actions.  If “responsibility for the 
alleged misconduct can likely be established or corroborated,” the Chair might refer the 
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 The accused student would be “advised to seek legal counsel,” whereas advice to the complainant to 
obtain legal counsel was optional.  Id. 
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matter to a subcommittee of the Board for a full investigation.284  If, however, “the 
essential facts of an allegation are contested” or if “responsibility for the alleged conduct 
cannot be clearly established from the statements or other preliminary documents, the 
Chair will refer the matter to the full Administrative Board.”285  The Board would then 
choose to “refer the matter to a subcommittee for further investigation, bracket or 
postpone a decision on the matter pending receipt of additional specific information, or 
decline to pursue the complaint further and instead refer to students to other avenues of 
possible resolution.”286  A complainant’s ability to meet the ancient corroboration and 
prompt complaint requirements would determine which outcome she obtained.  
Ironically, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts has never imposed a prompt 
complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, or cautionary instructions in its rules 
for the criminal prosecution of sexual offenses.287  As a result, in theory at least, it is 
harder to be disciplined at Harvard College for having raped a student under the 2002 
Procedures than it is to be convicted in the Commonwealth and incarcerated in a 
Massachusetts prison for the same act.
In June 2002, an anonymous Harvard student filed a complaint with the Office of 
Civil Rights (“OCR”) at the Department of Justice.  The student claimed that Harvard’s 
2002 Procedures violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 because they 
did not provide students “access to a prompt and equitable resolution of complaints.”288
The complaint alleged that, because the 2002 Procedures required sexual assault victims 
to provide “sufficient independent corroboration” before a formal investigation into the 
complaint would be launched, the policy discriminated against the (mostly female) 
victims of sexual assault on campus.289
OCR investigated the complaint and concluded that there was no Title IX 
violation.290  It determined that Harvard’s 2002 Procedures, including the “sufficient 
independent corroboration” requirement and the preliminary investigation stage, did not 
deny sexual assault victims a “prompt and equitable process” for resolving their 
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proceedings if it appears from a reasonable preliminary inquiry that further investigation 
would not produce evidence that could resolve the complaint.”292
In 2003, the Harvard faculty revised some of the language in the 2002 Procedures.  
The relevant passage now states:
Complaints must ordinarily be brought to the College in a timely manner.  
The Board typically cannot resolve peer dispute cases in which there is 
little evidence except the conflicting statements of the principals.  
Therefore, students are asked to provide as much information as possible 
to support their allegations.  Based on that information and any other 
information obtained through investigation, the Board will decide whether 
to issue a charge.293
This revision failed to alter the prompt complaint requirement.  Harvard’s insistence that 
the Board “cannot resolve peer disputes in which there is little evidence except the 
conflicting statements of the principals” remains the same.  Instead of being told that the 
Board will “not consider a case unless the allegations … are supported by independent 
corroborating evidence,” complainants are “asked to provide as much information as 
possible to support their allegations.”  Based on the information provided, the Board will 
decide whether to issue a charge and continue with investigation.  Although the troubling 
word “corroborating” has been erased from the policy, the revision is one of form and not 
substance.  Robert Mitchell, director of communications for the Faculty of Arts and 
Sciences at Harvard, stated that nothing in the revision changed the way Harvard handles 
sexual assaults and the revision of the policy is “purely for clarification.”294  The Dean of 
Harvard College agreed, indicating that the revision to the 2002 Procedures is “not 
substantial.”295
Robert Iuliano, Harvard’s deputy general counsel, now suggests that victims of 
acquaintance rape turn to the Massachusetts criminal justice system for relief since the 
Harvard Administrative Board can no longer help them.  He asserts, “The courts, or at 
least the police, are in a better position to conduct an investigation.  They have access to 
investigative tools that we don’t have.”296  Dean Harry Lewis concurs, “I want to 
encourage women to take cases to the criminal justice system where something can be 
done.  We don’t have forensic laboratories, we don’t have subpoenas.”297  There is no 
evidence, however, that the trouble with rape cases at Harvard was that the Board lacked 
subpoena power or a place to conduct DNA analysis.  In campus acquaintance rape cases 
in which the defense is almost always consent neither investigative tool is often used.298
challenged in the OCR Ruling were those that were to be followed by a student bringing a complaint 
against another student.  See id.  “Title IX does not prohibit the use of due process.  Nor does it set specific 
standards of how much process is required.”
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294
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Iuliano and Lewis are no doubt aware that the criminal justice system, with its standard of 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, rarely provides relief to acquaintance rape 
victims.299
Sheldon Steinbach, general counsel for the American Council on Education, an 
umbrella organization of 1,800 colleges, nevertheless heralded Harvard College’s new 
sexual assault procedures as “creative, innovative, and an attempt to try and insert a 
degree of fairness in a process that is, because of the nature of the allegations of sexual 
assault, unduly complicated.”300  Harvey Silverglate, an attorney who has represented a 
number of students accused of rape, agrees: “The new policy is one of the best things to 
happen to the campus judicial system in years.”301  Because the OCR at the Department 
of Justice has now given Harvard College the green light in its sexual assault policy, 
other schools may imitate the institution.  Mr. Steinbach predicts: “When a prominent 
institution tries something innovative, other institutions are likely to follow.”302
To analyze the sexual assault policies at the other top colleges and universities in 
the country, I attempted to contact what U.S. News & World Report listed in its 2003 
survey as the top 50 national universities303 and the top 50 liberal arts colleges.304  I 
received hard copies of sexual assault policies from 31 institutions305 and obtained sexual 
assault policies from 33 other institutions’ websites.306  In total, I reviewed 64 campus 
sexual assault policies.307
Like Harvard’s 1993 Policy, the majority of these institutions have sexual assault 
policies that are victim-friendly in some respects.  A number of policies list the 
299 PARROT & BECHOFER, supra note 261, at 125 (“a woman’s not consenting to sex is not enough [for a 
rape conviction] in the eyes of most jurors, especially if the rapist was acquainted with the victim and did 
not use a weapon.”).
300
 Emery, supra note 36.
301
 Harvey Silverglate & Josh Gewolb, Rape Charges: It’s Time To End “He Said/She Said” Justice, 
CHRON. HIGHER ED., Ap. 16, 2002, at 20.
302 Id.
303 See http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/rankings/brief/natudoc/tier1/t1natudoc_brief.php. 
304 See http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/rankings/brief/libartco/tier1/t1libartco_brief.php. 
305
 Amherst College, Brandeis University, Bryn Mawr College, Carnegie Mellon University, Colby 
College, College of the Holy Cross, Connecticut College, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, 
Georgetown University, Georgia Institute of Technology, Macalester College, Mount Holyoke College, 
Pomona College, Rennsselaer Polytechnic Institute, Rhodes College, Sarah Lawrence College, Stanford 
University, Union College, University of California-Irvine, University of California-Los Angeles, 
University of Chicago, University of Notre Dame, University of Texas at Austin, Vanderbilt University, 
Wake Forest, Washington and Lee University, Washington University in St. Louis, Wesleyan University, 
Whitman College, Yale University.
306
 Boston College, Bowdoin College, Brown University, California Institute of Technology, Carleton 
College, Case Western Reserve University, Claremont McKenna College, Columbia University, Davidson 
College, DePauw University, Duke University, Franklin and Marshall College, Gettysburg College, 
Grinnell College, Hamilton College, Harvard College, Kenyon College, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Middlebury College, New York University, Northwestern University, Oberlin College, 
Occidental College, Pennsylvania State University, Pepperdine University, Princeton University, Rice 
University, Smith College, University of Michigan, University of North Carolina, University of 
Pennsylvania, University of Virginia, Williams College. 
307
 The National Institute of Justice recently surveyed the sexual assault policies of 2,438 institutions of 
higher learning but did not cite or quote the policies specifically.  See generally KARJANE ET AL., supra
note 201.  It found that only 7 in 10 schools mentioned having disciplinary procedures in their sexual 
assault policies.  Id. at 105.
44
complainant’s rights,308 emphasize the institution’s commitment to confidentiality,309
instruct students about what to do if they are sexually assaulted,310 state that pursuing 
disciplinary procedures is up to the complainant,311 give examples of what is and is not 
considered sexual assault,312 or provide other consoling and helpful suggestions.313
In terms of prompt complaint, campus policies routinely urge victims to report 
having been sexually assaulted as soon as possible.  For example, Amherst College’s 
policy states:
You are encouraged to report immediately any incidents of this nature . . . 
even if you do not wish to pursue the matter further.  Keep in mind that an 
assailant who is allowed to go unpursued is a potential future danger, not 
only to you but also to other members of the community.314
The Georgia Institute of Technology states simply, “Time is of the essence when a sexual 
assault has occurred.  The sooner an assault is reported, the easier it is to collect valuable 
evidence.”315
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In a number of campus policies, it appears that the failure to promptly complain 
may be held against the alleged victim.  For example, one policy declares, “Any student 
of Occidental College who feels that he or she has been the subject of sexual assault or 
any person witnessing sexual assault should promptly report the incident.”316  Pepperdine 
University’s policy urges, “Victims understandably find rape and sexual assault upsetting 
and painful to discuss.  However, it is important to report the incident as soon as 
possible.”317  Washington and Lee University states, “Because it is often difficult to 
determine the facts of an incident long after it occurred, complaints should be filed as 
soon as possible.”318
By contrast, a number of schools make explicit that, although students are urged 
to promptly report, there is no prompt complaint requirement.  For example, the 
California Institute of Technology’s policy states: “Students who wish to file a complaint 
against another student should do so as soon as possible after the assault, although 
complaints may be filed at any time.”319  Many institutions make clear that there is no 
time limit for complaints of sexual assault when both the complainant and the accused are 
students.  Wake Forest, for example, notes, “While students are encouraged to report any 
sexual assault as soon as possible, they may initiate University judicial proceedings at 
any time while the individuals involved are students at the University.”320
or Campus Security.  Reporting the incident allows College personnel to assist with providing services for 
psychological and medical attention, and other available support.”  MACALESTER COLLEGE, STUDENT 
HANDBOOK 47 (2002).  Bowdoin College’s policy states that reporting as soon as possible benefits a 
victim’s case against the accused, “Remember, delayed reporting makes it harder on you and more difficult 
to find and convict the attacker.”  BOWDOIN COLLEGE, STUDENT HANDBOOK 65 (2003) located at 
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320 WAKE FOREST, STUDENT BOOK 49 (2002).  Georgetown University likewise notes, “There is no time 
limit imposed as to when a formal complaint of misconduct may be initiated against any student currently 
registered at Georgetown University.”  GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, STUDENT HANDBOOK (SECTION 4) 5 
(2002).  Sarah Lawrence College insists, “There is no deadline for filing complaints, but in order for a 
hearing to occur both parties must be currently enrolled at the College throughout the hearing process.  The 
College, however, encourages any student who wishes to file a complaint to do so promptly.”  Sarah 
Lawrence College Sexual Harassment/ Assault Policy pg. 103.  Whitman College states, “Any Whitman 
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A minority of campus policies limits the time period within which a sexual assault 
must be reported.  Columbia University, for example, requires an incident to be reported 
within five years.321  Duke University requires a report within two years.322
Northwestern University requires a report within one year.323  Stanford University grants 
accused students the right: “To have charges filed no more than six months after the 
alleged misconduct occurred or should reasonably have been discovered.”324  Wesleyan 
University states, “Reports should be submitted as soon as possible, but preferably within 
five (5) days of the incident.”325  In terms of a prompt complaint requirement, then, 
college and university sexual assault policies are widely diverse.  Many strongly 
encourage rape victims to promptly complain, a few suggest that the failure to do so will 
be held against the complainant, and a few maintain a prompt complaint rule as statutes 
of limitations.
By contrast, none of the campus sexual assault policies reviewed besides 
Harvard’s contains language about a corroboration requirement or cautionary 
instructions.  This silence is not surprising given that very few policies even articulate 
what the standard of proof is for the finding of a disciplinary infraction.  A recent 
National Institute of Justice survey of the sexual assault policies of 2,438 institutions of 
higher learning found that just one in five articulated a standard of proof.326  The standard 
of proof is explicit in only 22 out of the 64 policies from the top institutions I reviewed.  
The National Institute of Justice found that, in those policies in which it was 
explicit, eight of ten used “preponderance of the evidence.”  Among top universities and 
colleges I reviewed, a majority also used a “preponderance of the evidence” or “more 
321
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likely than not” standard.327  Five required clear and convincing evidence.328  A few 
developed their own standards.  Northwestern University required “sufficient 
evidence,”329 Whitman College required “highly probable” evidence,330 and Washington 
and Lee University indicated that the finding of a disciplinary infraction “must be 
supported by reasonable evidence.”331  The broad range of standards of proof for 
disciplinary infractions indicates that there is no uniformly accepted method for 
evaluating these claims.  The problem with silence on the standard of proof is that the 
age-old theories of rape regarding corroboration and caution that have largely been 
discredited in criminal law may unduly influence disciplinary tribunals’ perceptions of 
what is required for a finding of sexual assault.  
Independent of the formal sexual assault policies that colleges and universities 
maintain, informal practices by higher educational institutions in response to campus 
sexual assault suggest a matching concern with false accusations and a belief that women 
provoke or cause rape with their bad behavior.  The recent scandal at the Air Force 
Academy (“AFA”) provides one example.  
In the past year, more than 50 current and former AFA cadets have recounted 
publicly their stories of mistreatment when they reported having been raped to campus 
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officials.332  In response to these reports, the AFA often ignored the male perpetrators but 
disciplined the female complainants for the minor infractions they committed on the 
incidents in question, such as drinking, fraternizing with upper class cadets, or having sex 
in the dorms (referring to the alleged rape itself).333
When Sharon enrolled in the AFA, older female cadets told her, “If you’re a 
woman and you graduate and this hasn’t happened to you, you’re one of the select few.  
So expect [rape] to happen.”334  She still did not believe she was in danger.  One night in 
1999, Sharon got a ride home from a movie from a male cadet.335  He pulled the car over
and raped her.336  When Sharon reported having been raped to her military superiors, two 
AFA officers grilled her for four hours in a windowless basement room and told her she 
was a liar.337  Thereafter they closed the case against her attacker.338
After a party drinking and playing strip poker, a male AFA cadet raped Lisa in a 
bathroom.339  Lisa reported the rape to her commanding officer, and supported her claim 
with testimony from witnesses who saw her crying and saw blood on the bathroom floor, 
as well as a medical exam that noted several abrasions, contusions, and tears inside and 
outside her vagina.340  When she went to the Commandant of students to ask that her 
attacker be court-martialed, General S. Taco Gilbert III told her, “I want the cadet wing to 
know that your behavior that night was wrong and unacceptable” and that, if he had his 
way, he would see Lisa marching alongside her attacker as punishment.341  Lisa reported 
that Gen. Gilbert told her she “didn’t have to go to that party. Didn’t have to drink that 
night, didn’t have to play the card game and didn’t have to follow him back into that 
332 See Reid, supra note 27, at A4; Foster, supra note 27, at 1A.
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Their Own Battle, DENVER WESTWORD (CO), Jan. 30, 2003, at A1.  Defense counsel jumped on the fact 
that Lisa had earlier commented that the attack was as much her fault as her assailant’s and that she did not 
think they had sex.  The defense attorneys also claimed that since Lisa was a Catholic and a virgin she was 
having regrets about the night in question and made up the accusation.  Id.  Lastly, they also attacked the 
fact she could not remember every detail of the incident.  Id.  Even those on “her side” of the case did not 
fully represent her interests.  Major Vladimir Shifrin, the academy’s chief of military justice, stated that the 
prosecuting attorney represents the AFA and not the victim; therefore, “I would prosecute the case in the 
best interest of the government, not necessarily the best interest of the victim…”  Id.  Lisa also wondered 
why the prosecution neither brought in experts to talk about post-traumatic stress to rebut the defense’s 
claim about Lisa’s selective memory nor focused on the fact that consent is not given when a person is 
alcohol-impaired under the AFA’s sexual assault regulations.  Id.
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 Dominus, supra note 334, at 254.  Since August 2001, when General Gilbert became Commandant of 
the Cadets, the AFA instituted a tough new anti-crime policy.  Michael Moss, General’s Crackdown 
Faulted in Rapes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2003, at A10.  The policy voided a previous amnesty program and 
led to more problems for victims of sexual assault.  Every minor infraction that rape victims had engaged in 
became a shield for those who had attacked them.  While Gilbert cracked down on drug and alcohol use, 
sexual assaults were rarely investigated or punished.  Id.
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bathroom.”342  Lisa responded to him by saying, “You know what, Sir?  He didn’t have to 
rape me.”343  Gilbert analyzed the case in writing:
[Lisa] did engage in some very high-risk behavior that night.  Again, the 
behavior in no way justifies what happened to her, but when you put 
yourself in situations with increased risk, you have to take increased 
precautions to mitigate those risks.  For example, if I walk down a dark 
alley with hundred-dollar bills hanging out of my pockets, it doesn’t 
justify my being attacked or robbed, but I certainly increased the risks by 
doing what I did.  The behavior she engaged in is not behavior we 
condone for our cadets or our officers in the Air Force.  This standard isn’t 
just for the Air Force Academy; it’s an Air Force standard.344
The AFA chose not to court-martial Lisa’s attacker.345  Like Harvard officials who 
blamed their own inability to discipline campus rape on the victims’ “unrealistic 
expectations” about the process, the Air Force working group charged with investigating 
the AFA asserted that the sexual abuse scandal may have been caused by “unrealistic 
expectations for prosecutions in the minds of victims.”346
As a result of the sexual abuse scandal that Sharon and Lisa’s stories typify, the 
Air Force ushered in new policies at the AFA.  While offering complainants “amnesty 
from Academy discipline arising in connection with the alleged offense,” the new sexual 
342
 Jargon, supra note 340.
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 Id.  Despite the case not going to court martial, an administrative hearing will take place concerning 
whether her attacker will be honorably or dishonorably discharged.  Id.  
346 DEPT. OF THE AIR FORCE , THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP CONCERNING THE DETERRENCE OF 
AND RESPONSE TO INCIDENTS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AT THE U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY 22 (2003).  The 
AFA grouped the crimes of rape, forcible sodomy, indecent assault, assault with intent to commit rape or 
sodomy, carnal knowledge, and indecent acts or liberties with a child (separate crimes under the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice) under the term “sexual assault” and defined it as:
[T]he unlawful touching of another in a sexual manner, including attempts, in order to 
arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust or sexual desires of the accused, the victim or both, 
and which is without justification, excuse, or consent.  Sexual assault includes, but is not 
limited to rape, sodomy, fondling, unwanted touching of a sexual nature, and indecent 
sexual acts that the victim does not consent to, or is explicitly or implicitly forced into.  
Consent is not given where there is force, threat of force, coercion, or when the person is 
alcohol impaired, underage, or unconscious.  It is immaterial whether the touching is 
directly upon the body of another or is committed through the person’s clothing.
Id. at 23.  Although this definition appeared to equate alcohol impairment with non-consent, the working 
group was concerned that alcohol impairment short of intoxication is not enough to negate consent under 
the UCMJ.  Id.  The working group was also concerned that the consent definition did not make clear that, 
“If a victim in possession of his or her mental faculties fails to make lack of consent reasonably manifest by 
taking such measures of resistance as are called by the circumstances, the inference may be drawn that the 
victim did consent.”  Id. at 24.  It thus concluded, “By using an expansive definition not linked to specific 
crimes, with misinformation regarding alcohol impairment on the issue of consent, and a general lack of 
information regarding consent issues, cadets can be misled regarding the ability of command to respond to 
their reports.”  Id. at iv.  The working group cited no evidence, however, that any female cadet who 
reported sexual misconduct and was shunned by her superiors was misled by the AFA definition of sexual 
assault.
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assault policy also mandated prompt disclosure: “All allegations of sexual assault will be 
reported to the officer chain of command immediately.”347  When a rape victim confers 
with a therapist at the Counseling Center or calls the campus rape crisis line, then, her 
name and narrative of having been sexually assaulted must immediately be reported to 
the Vice Commandant of the AFA.348  The AFA thus publishes a victim’s complaint at an 
early stage, requiring her to make an involuntary prompt complaint to her commanders 
before she may be emotionally and psychologically ready.  This rule will deter victims 
from coming forward with complaints.349
About one in three civilian institutions of higher learning maintain a policy 
similar to the AFA’s mandatory reporting rule.350  They maintain “designated mandatory 
reporters,” school officials who are required to report (sometimes confidentially) all 
instances of rape or sexual assault to the police.351  One in three campuses similarly 
mandates that students who report rape or sexual assault must participate in the 
adjudication process.352  These policies also deter complaints because rape victims do not 
want their families or friends to find out and they distrust even confidential procedures 
for mandatory reporting, where they exist.353
Anecdotal evidence suggests that a similar mentality that blames the victim for 
her rape in the disciplinary infractions she engaged in on the instance in question may 
also be found at some civilian institutions.  Kristin, a former Boston University student, 
was raped on campus one night after she drank heavily.354  She and her attacker engaged 
in consensual petting but Kristin told him she did not want to engage in intercourse 
because she was a virgin.355  Despite her protests, he pinned her down and penetrated 
her.356 Kristin reported the rape to Boston University officials.  Instead of punishing her 
alleged attacker, university officials suspended Kristin and fined her $250 for violating 
the school’s alcohol policy and $250 for sexually assaulting her assailant.357  Robert B. 
Smith, Boston University’s general counsel, sent a letter to Kristin’s attorney, stating that 
the institution: 
347
 United States Air Force Academy, Agenda for Change, at http://www.usafa.af.mil/agenda.cfm. 
348 See Diana Jean Schemo, Academy Cadet Chief Backs Rape Report Disclosures, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 
2003, at A6.
349
 Erin Emery, “False” Confidence Blinded Academy Leader, DENVER POST, July 13, 2003, at B6 
(quoting one former raped cadet commenting on new policy, “There’s no way anyone will say they were 
raped.  The reporting will go down.”).  See also KARJANE ET AL., supra note 201, at xi (“Any policy or 
procedure that compromises, or worse, eliminates the student victim’s ability to make her or his own 
informed choices about proceeding through the reporting and adjudication process—such as mandatory 
reporting requirements that do not include an anonymous reporting option or require a victim to participate 
in the adjudication process if the report is filed—not only reduces reporting rates but may be counter 
productive to the victim’s healing process”).
350 KARJANE ET AL., supra note 201 at 77.
351 Id.  
352 Id.  
353 Id. at 81, 83, 85, & 93.
354
 Tom Farmer, Alleged Rape Victim: BU Hiding Sex Crimes, BOST. HERALD, Nov.28, 2001, at 1.
355 Id.
356 Id.
357 Id.  Because she did not appear at her disciplinary hearing, Daryl J. DeLuca, director of Boston 
University’s Judicial Affairs, sent a letter to Kristin, her parents and other university officials, about it and 
used descriptions and quotes from the incident that were so sexually graphic that The Boston Herald could 
not include them into its story about this case.  Id.
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cannot guarantee the safety of students from their own irresponsibility or 
voluntary conduct.  We cannot prevent them from making poor choices.  
Your client made poor choices, drank and behaved badly earlier in the 
evening.358
Although the Boston University Board of Student Conduct eventually exonerated Kristin 
of the sexual assault charge, it upheld her fine for underage drinking.359
Another Boston University student, Meghann was raped after smoking marijuana 
with her attacker.360  When she reported the rape, she was charged with drug possession, 
placed on probation, and fined $250.361  Boston University informed both Meghann and 
Kristin that there was insufficient evidence to discipline the male students they accused 
of rape.362
In a 2000 study on campus sexual assault adjudication, the Association for 
Student Judicial Affairs found that the majority of colleges and universities did not 
provide rape victims who come forward to report their victimization protection from 
charges of alcohol or drug use.363  Victims at a number of colleges and universities may 
be deterred from proceeding with complaints of a sexual assault if they were drinking at 
the time of the incident.364  Officials at some colleges and universities even tell the victim 
that, because she was drinking during the incident, no crime occurred.365  Despite the lack 
of a legal basis for this assertion, officials can convince many victims that their 
intoxication is a seriously mitigating circumstance in the crime.366  Catherine Bath, 
program director at the nonprofit group Security on Campus, says that some colleges and 
universities now employ an array of informal but aggressive tactics to decrease rape 
358 Id.
359Tom Farmer, Student Claims BU Blamed Her for Being Raped, BOST. HERALD, May 20, 2002, at 19, 
Marie Szaniszlo, Backlash Said To Keep Rapes Under Wraps, BOST. HERALD, Apr. 21, 2002, at 17.
360
 Szaniszlo, supra note 359.
361 Id.  Eventually the Boston University Board of Student Conduct overturned Meghann’s conviction on 
the drug charges.  Tom Farmer, Alleged BU Rape Victim Cleared of Pot Charges, BOST. HERALD, Oct. 16, 
2002, at 3.
362 Id.  Both women filed civil rights complaints against Boston University with the Office of Civil Rights 
for the U.S. Department of Education.  Alice Dembner, US Dismisses Rights Complaints Against BU Cases 
Centered on Rape Charges, BOST. GLOBE, Apr. 26, 2003, at B2.  The Office of Civil Rights found, 
however, that there was not enough evidence to show that BU failed to investigate the complaints fairly or 
that its “zero tolerance” policy on alcohol and drugs had a chilling effect on the filing of sexual assault 
complaints.  Id.  The Office of Civil Rights explained that, because the anti-alcohol and drug policy was 
applied uniformly, it was not discriminatory.  Tom Mashberg, BU cleared in handling of student rape 
claims, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 26, 2003, at 008.  It did however criticize the university for releasing 
information about the case to the media.  Dembner, supra.  Such a “zero tolerance” policy is, however, 
contrary to what is done by law enforcement and prosecutors.  Farmer, supra note 361.
363 ASSOCIATION FOR STUDENT JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, NATIONAL BASELINE STUDY ON CAMPUS SEXUAL 
ASSAULT: ADJUDICATING SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES (2000), at http://asja.tamu.edu/news/baseline_study.asp
(53% of institutions do not afford rape victims such immunity).  The study did not address other charges 
against victims who come forward, such as sexual misconduct or having sex in the dorms, which typically 
are levied at private schools).
364 BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 35, at 133-34.
365 See id.
366 See PARROT & BECHOFER, supra note 261, at 83.
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reports.367  “We’ve seen victims outright discouraged from reporting rape because 
they’ve been told they could be found guilty of drinking or having sex in the dorms.”368
As a result, she says many campus victims “are afraid of even going through the campus 
judicial system for fear of being sanctioned.”369
B. Motivation to Deter Complaints of Campus Sexual Assault 
Campus officials may be motivated to deter complaints of campus sexual assault 
for three reasons: 1) officials may not want to be bothered with most campus rapes 
because they do not conform to the stereotype of violent stranger rape, 2) officials may 
fear substantial negative press because federal law obligates campus administrators to 
disseminate reports of campus rape widely, and 3) officials may fear civil suits from 
students disciplined for campus rape.  Tools derived from the discredited prompt 
complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions from the 
criminal law of rape can allow campus administrators to deter reports of campus rape and 
to dispose swiftly of those reports that do come to light.
When people think about rape, most imagine a stereotypical scenario.  They 
picture a black stranger jumping out of the bushes, dragging an innocent white woman 
into a dark alley, beating her viciously, and raping her.370  They also imagine rape to be a 
rare occurrence.  These racist and sexist stereotypes are misleading and inaccurate, 
particularly in terms of campus rape.  Rape is not a rare occurrence.  One in four women 
of college age have suffered from an attempted or completed rape.371  One in five female 
college students suffer a rape or attempted rape during their college years.372  Typically, 
rapes are committed not by black men on white women but by men on women of the 
367




369 Id.  See also KARJANE ET AL., supra note 201, at 81.
370 SAMPSON, supra note 234, at 9.  See also Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
1241 (1991) (referring to the “dominant conceptualization of rape as quintessentially Black offender/white 
victim”); Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 596 
(1990) (critiquing Catharine MacKinnon’s “general account” of rape as “a strange (read Black)” offender, 
for forgetting that the victim’s race is implicitly white). 
As a result of a cultural and media focus on the exceptional, violent, reported cases of black on 
white rape, fear of stranger rape among college women is much more widespread, although acquaintance 
rape is much more common. SAMPSON, supra note 234, at 8.  College policies may exacerbate that 
misplaced fear.  A recent National Institute of Justice study of more than two thousand institutions of 
higher learning indicated, “Institutional authorities may (unintentionally) condone victim-blaming (for 
example by circulating materials that focus on the victim’s responsibility to avoid sexual assault rather than 
on the perpetrator).”  KARJANE ET AL., supra note 201, at 83.  The study continues, “target-hardening crime 
prevention strategies are problematic, as they may inadvertently reinforce stranger-rape myths, overstate 
the risk of such victimization, and alleviate people’s fear of being raped or sexually assaulted by someone 
they know.”  KARJANE ET AL., supra note 201, at 97.
371 SAMPSON, supra note 234, at 2.  See also PARROT & BECHOFER, supra note 261, at 19-20 (citing Mary 
P. Koss, Hidden Rape: Incidence, Prevalence, and Descriptive Characteristics of Sexual Aggression and 
Victimization in a National Sample of College Students, 2 SEXUAL ASSAULT 1-25 (Burgess ed. 1988); 
Christine A. Gidycz & Nadine Wisniewski, The Scope of Rape: Incidence and Prevalence of Sexual 
Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Higher Education Students, 55 J. CONSULTING AND 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 162, 166-69 (1987)).  
372 KARJANE ET AL., supra note 201, at 4.  
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same race.373  Campus rapes rarely involve strangers; they are committed by 
acquaintances: classmates, friends, fraternity brothers.374  Campus rapes tend to happen in 
dorm rooms or during parties, not in the dark alleys of city streets.375  They happen to 
women who are not “innocent,” but who have prior sexual experiences as varied as any 
other college students their age.376  Rapes on campus rarely involve weapons, vicious 
beatings, or other indisputable evidence of force.377  Acquaintance rapists do not need to 
employ those tools; they ply with alcohol, pin with their body weight, and verbally and 
physically coerce.378  As a result, campus acquaintance rapes often lack corroborative 
evidence of a violent physical struggle.379  Often there are no witnesses to corroborate the
victim’s testimony.380  Moreover, because many believe that students will and perhaps 
should engage in a certain amount of sexual experimentation at college, people may be 
predisposed to believe that a questionable sexual encounter on campus was not a 
transgression.
Alcohol use by college students has a sizable impact on sexual assaults on 
campus.381  Increased drinking frequency and intensity are both associated with sexually 
aggressive behavior by white male college students.382  In one study, 16 percent of male 
college students admitted giving or encouraging the use of drugs or alcohol to obtain 
sex.383  Some men stereotypically believe women who drink are more sexually 
available.384  Others may use their own inebriation to justify or excuse their sexually 
aggressive behavior.385  As many as 75 percent of perpetrators and 50 percent of victims 
of acquaintance rapes on campus were consuming alcohol at the time of the attacks.386
Importantly, the intoxication of both parties makes people more willing to shift blame 
from the perpetrator to the victim of sexual assault.  When the victim and the assailant are 
both moderately or highly intoxicated, individuals assign the victim significantly more 
blame and the perpetrator significantly less.387
373 GREENFELD, supra note 4, at 11 (victims of rape were evenly divided between white and blacks; in 88% 
of rapes, the victim and the offender were of the same race).
374 See BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 35, at 2 & 26.  See also SAMPSON, supra note 234, at 9; KARJANE, 
supra note 201 (84-97.8 percent of campus rapes committed by acquaintances).
375 SAMPSON, supra note 234, at 7 (“Almost 60 percent of the completed campus rapes that take place on 
campus occur in the victim’s residence, 31 percent occur in another residence, and 10 percent occur in a 
fraternity”).
376 Id. at 9.
377 See PARROT & BECHOFER, supra note 261, at 3, 116, 125 (explaining that acquaintance rape occurs as a 
result of nonviolent coercion).  See also SAMPSON, supra note 234, at 9.
378 See PARROT & BECHOFER, supra note 261, at 124.
379 SAMPSON, supra note 234, at 9.  See also id. at 7 (“Only 20 percent of college rape victims have 
additional injuries, most often bruises, black eyes, cuts , swelling, or chipped teeth.”).
380 Id. at 7.
381 Id. at 13.
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383
 C. Mills et al., Date and Acquaintance Rape among a Sample of College Students, 37 SOC. WORK 504 
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386 See BHOMER & PARROT, supra note 35, at 198.
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 Karla J. Stormo, Alan R. Lang, & Werner G. K. Stritzke, Attributions About Acquaintance Rape: The 
Role of Alcohol and Individual Differences, 27 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 279, 299 (FEB. 1997).  However, 
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In the typical campus rape, then, male and female classmates consume alcohol at 
a party and then go to a dorm room alone.  There, he pins and penetrates her, despite her 
cries or alcohol-induced incapacitation.  There are no strangers, no bushes, no knives, and 
no innocence.  Because campus rape does not conform to stereotypical rape, campus 
officials often dismiss the serious psychological, emotional, and social harm it causes.388
One motivation to deter complaints of campus rape, then, is that administrators are in the 
dark about the extent of the problem and fail to grasp the real harm of this kind of rape.389
Another motivation to deter complaints of campus rape is that administrators may 
be trying to protect their institutional reputations, massaging campus-wide numbers to 
make them look good.390   The Clery Act requires colleges and universities to provide 
annual reports to the Secretary of Education on the number of sexual crimes that occur on 
campus.391  The college or university must make these reports available to “all current 
students and employees” as well as to prospective students.392  The Clery Act requires 
when the victim was more intoxicated than the perpetrator, the perpetrator was blamed more.  Participants 
may blame the perpetrator in that case because he takes advantage of her intoxication.  Id. 
388 SAMPSON, supra note 234, at 9.
389 Id. at 3 (“most offenders are neither confronted nor prosecuted, and colleges are left in the dark about 
the extent of the problem [of campus rape]”).
390
 Michael Griffaton, Note, Forewarned Is Forearmed: The Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 
1990 and the Future of Institutional Liability for Student Victimizations, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 525, 532 
(1993).
391
 Jeanne Clery, a student at Lehigh University, was raped and murdered in her dorm room in 1986.  See
20 U.S.C.S. § 1092 (f) (2003) (citing historical notes on amendments, citing Act of July 23, 1992, sec. 
486(3)(c), Pub. L. No. 102-325,  § 1092(f)(1)(F). When her parents learned that the crime rate at Lehigh 
was high—38 assaults and other violent crimes over a three-year period—they contended that their 
daughter would never have attended the university had she known of that rate.  Mark Fritz, The Politics of 
Personal Grieving, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1999. As a result, they lobbied Congress to pass federal legislation 
to require colleges to make their sexual crime statistics public.  Mike Kennedy, Safety by the Numbers, AM. 
SCH. & U., Oct. 2000.
The Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act was the first federal legislation to require 
institutions of higher learning that participated in government financial assistance programs to report to the 
Secretary of Education crimes that occurred on campus. See 20 U.S.C.S. § 1092 (2003) (historical notes 
on amendments, citing Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of Nov. 8, 1990, sec. 204(c), Pub. L. 
No. 101-542 (effective Sept. 1, 1991)).  In 1992, Congress passed the Clery Act, which added sexual 
assaults to the list of crimes institutions were required to report.  See 20 U.S.C.S. § 1092 (f) (2003) (citing 
historical notes on amendments, citing Act of July 23, 1992, sec. 486(3)(c), Pub. L. No. 102-325,  § 
1092(f)(1)(F).  In 1998, the statute was amended to require that colleges and universities keep a daily log, 
in plain language, of all crimes reported to campus police departments and to make the log available to the 
public.  See id. (citing historical notes on amendments, citing Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security 
Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act, Act of Oct. 7, 1998 sec. 486(e)).  The Act then became known as 
the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (“Clery Act”).
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 The Act also requires that institutions include in these reports “a statement of current policies 
concerning security and access to campus facilities,” “a statement of current policies concerning campus 
law enforcement,” and “a description of programs designed to inform students and employees about the 
prevention of crimes.”  Id.  The information must include “policies for making timely warning reports to 
members of the campus community” when one of the specific crimes does occur, “policies for preparing 
the annual disclosure of crime statistics,” and a statement of “whether the institution has any policies or 
procedures that allow victims or witnesses to report crimes on a voluntary, confidential basis for inclusion 
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34 C.F.R. § 668.46(b)(2)(i-iii) (2002).  There is one exception to the timely warning requirement—“An 
institution is not required to provide a timely warning with respect to crimes reported to a pastoral or 
professional counselor.”  Id.
55
colleges and universities to “maintain a daily log” of “all crimes reported to such police 
or security department.”393  The log must contain the time, location, and nature of the 
crime, as well as “the disposition of the complaint, if known.”394   The log must “be open 
to public inspection within two business days of the initial report being made to the 
department or a campus security authority.”395  Only 36.5 percent of colleges and 
universities report their crime statistics in a manner fully consistent with the Clery Act.396
Because federal law requires that colleges and universities widely distribute 
information about reported rapes on campus, campus officials may be more driven by a 
concern for the image of their institutions than by protecting sexual assault victims on 
campus.397 The Department of Justice has noted, “campus police may be influenced by 
college administrators who fear that too strong an emphasis on the problem [of 
acquaintance rape] may lead potential students and their parents to believe that rape 
occurs more often at their college than at others.”398  As a result, campus officials may be 
motivated to deter such reports.
Another reason colleges and universities may try to deter complaints of campus 
rape is that they fear civil lawsuits from students disciplined as a result of these 
complaints.399  In assessing students’ rights vis-à-vis campus disciplinary proceedings, 
courts have held that students have the due process right to notice and the opportunity to 
be heard before they can be expelled from public universities.400  However, they have few 
due process rights against private universities.401  In private college and university 
settings, courts have mostly applied contract theories to review student disciplinary 
proceedings, sometimes incorporating a quasi-requirement of “fundamental” or “basic” 
393 See id. at (4)(A).
394 See id. at (4)(A)(i) & (ii).
395 See 20 U.S.C.S. § 1092(f) at (4)(B)(i).  The log must be “for the most recent 60-day period open to 
public inspection during normal business hours.”  34 C.F.R. § 668.46 at (f)(5).  The Clery Act also requires 
participating colleges and universities to publicize their policies regarding their “campus sexual assault 
programs, which shall be aimed at prevention of sex offenses; and the procedures followed once a sex 
offense has occurred.”  See 20 U.S.C.S. §1092(f) at 8(A)(i) & (ii).  Colleges and universities must also 
report possible sanctions for committing a sexual assault, disciplinary procedures for sexual assault, and 
procedures that victims of campus sexual assault should follow.  See id. at 8(B).  Seventeen states require 
state colleges and universities to engage in further information gathering and distribution.  KARJANE ET AL., 
supra note x at Table 3.2.
396 KARJANE ET AL., supra note 201 at viii.
397 Id. at 93.  See also Fritz, supra note 391 (“the Clerys and their supports point out that many schools have 
a long record of opposing anything that might poison their ivy-covered marketing image”); Debbie 
Goldberg, Crime on Campus: How Safe Are Students?. WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1988 (“Traditionally parents 
and students have considered course offerings, research capabilities, faculty credentials and social activities 
when choosing a college.  Now, some may be looking at another factor: crime”).
398 KARJANE ET AL., supra note 201 at 1.
399 BOHMER & PARROT, supra note 35, at 141.
400
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fairness.402  In general, courts have concluded that private universities must comply with 
their own procedures and act reasonably.403
There are about thirty- five written decisions in state and federal courts involving 
students who have sued their colleges or universities as a result of being disciplined for 
sexual assault.  Ordinarily, disciplined students are only successful when colleges or
universities are found to have deviated from the procedures outlined in their own 
disciplinary policies.  When a student wins such a lawsuit, a court then orders that the 
college or university grant the student a new disciplinary hearing untainted by the 
procedural anomaly.  Two examples are representative.  
Travis Marshall sued the State University of New York College at Old Westbury 
(“SUNY”) after he was expelled for rape.404  The SUNY disciplinary code provided for a 
hearing by a Judicial Review Committee and appeal to the Judicial Council.405  The 
disciplinary code indicated that no person “shall serve simultaneously on the Judicial 
Council and the Judicial Review Committee;”406 however, one associate dean at SUNY 
served on both Marshall’s Judicial Review Committee and his Judicial Council.407
Marshall sued on the basis of this procedural irregularity and the courts found that 
the dean’s dual service violated Marshall’s due process rights.408  The New York 
Supreme Court explained, “The violation by an agency of its own regulations even where 
they are more generous than the Constitution requires may, in and of itself, constitute a 
violation of a student’s due process rights.”409  The court then annulled Marshall’s 
expulsion and remanded the matter for a hearing before a new judicial council that was 
properly constituted according to SUNY’s code of judicial conduct.410
A Middlebury College student accused Ethan Fellheimer of rape.411  Middlebury 
told Fellheimer that the college disciplinary committee would investigate him on the 
charge of rape, but after finding him not guilty of rape, the committee adjudicated him 
guilty of “disrespect of persons” and suspended him for a year for “engaging in 
inappropriate sexual activity.”412  The Middlebury College Handbook for Students 
402
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403 Id. at 675.  There has also been a traditional distinction between academic and disciplinary matters in 
terms of the process due.  Academic violations require no notice and opportunity to be heard; whereas, 
disciplinary violations require notice and an opportunity to be heard.  Swem, supra note 32, at 364.  See 
also Dutile, supra note 32, at 243 (“Academic sanctions have occasioned greater deference from the 
courts”).
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 424 N.Y.S.2d 89 (S.Ct. N.Y. 1980).
405 Id.
406 Id. at 91 (quoting judicial process section of code of student conduct at SUNY).
407 Id. 
408 See id. at 92 (holding that requirement of impartiality in disciplinary proceedings and appeals is 
necessary to make hearing fair, and that having same person on both committees violated fairness).
409 Id. (citing Hupart v. Board of Higher Ed. of City of N.Y., 420 F.Supp. 1087, 1107).
410 See id. at 92.
411 Fellheimer v. Middlebury College, 869 F.Supp. 238 (D.Vt. 1994).  Although criminal charges were also 
filed with the state, Vermont eventually dropped the charges.  See id. at 240.  After Fellheimer was 
suspended, he appealed his suspension to the Judicial Review Board, but the suspension was upheld.  Id.
412 Id.  Fellheimer claimed to be unaware that “rape” and “disrespect of persons” were two separate 
charges, he thought instead that “disrespect of persons” was the provision under which “rape” was 
categorized.  See id. at 246.  Further, the confirmation form confirming the judicial hearing that was sent to 
Fellheimer referred to “Rape/Disrespect of Persons,” but gave no indication that those were actually two 
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indicated that the committee would “state the nature of the charges with sufficient 
particularity to permit the accused to meet the charges.”413  Fellheimer sued Middlebury 
College in federal court for breach of contract and violation of due process.  The District 
Court determined that Middlebury had created a contractual obligation that required it to 
“conduct its hearings in a manner consistent with the terms of the Handbook.”414  The 
court concluded that Middlebury breached its contract with Fellheimer because it 
provided him notice only of the rape charge and did not warn him of the “disrespect of 
persons” charge.415  Middlebury’s deviation from the procedures outlined in its 
Handbook rendered the hearing fundamentally unfair so the court granted Fellheimer’s 
motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim.416
If colleges and universities scrupulously follow their own procedures, they have 
little to worry about in terms of suits from disciplined students.  They should perhaps be 
more concerned with federal civil suits when they receive and ignore complaints from 
women who were sexually assaulted. Title IX requires: 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.417
Title IX may provide sexually victimized students with a cause of action against colleges 
and universities that know about and fail to redress sexually hostile environments caused 
by peers.  Federal courts are only beginning to articulate the contours of the application 
of Title IX to colleges and universities;418 however, the claim that colleges may be liable 
to sexually victimized students has enjoyed some success.419
IV. Freedom from the Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, 
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions
separate and distinct charges.  Id. at 245.  See id. at 241.  The state of Vermont, as well as the college 
disciplinary board, found Fellheimer not guilty of rape, which was the original charge.  Id.
413 Id.
414 Id. at 242.
415 Id. at 245.  Fellheimer claimed to be unaware that “rape” and “disrespect of persons” were two separate 
charges, he thought instead that “disrespect of persons” was the provision under which “rape” was 
categorized.  See id. at 246.  The confirmation form confirming the judicial hearing that was sent to 
Fellheimer referred to “Rape/Disrespect of Persons,” but gave no indication that those were actually two 
separate and distinct charges.  Id. at 245.
416 See id.  The court stated:
Fellheimer defended, successfully, against a charge of rape or sexual assault.  He was 
never told that he was being charged with a separate offense of disrespect of persons, or 
what conduct, if proven at the hearing, would constitute that offense.  As such, it was 
impossible for him to defend against that charge.
Id.
417
 20 U.S.C. 1681(a) (1994).
418
 Verna Williams & Deborah Brake, When a Kiss Isn’t Just a Kiss: Title IX and Student-To-Student 
Harassment, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV. 423, 424 (1997).
419 See generally id.  See also Timothy Davis & Tonya Parker, Student-Athlete Sexual Violence Against 
Women: Defining the Limits of Institutional Responsibility, 55 WASH & LEE L. REV. 55 (1998).
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As we have seen, new versions of the prompt complaint rule, the corroboration 
requirement, and cautionary instructions are now infecting disciplinary proceedings in the 
academic world.  The prompt complaint requirement unduly influences the timing and 
mandatory reporting rules that various colleges and universities have enacted for claims 
of sexual misconduct.  Harvard’s new policy indicates that a “timely” complaint is 
ordinarily required.  Some top schools suggest that a prompt complaint of sexual assault 
is necessary; others mandate it.  Those that are silent on the issue may still discourage 
complaints on the basis that they are not reported immediately.  
Additionally, the Air Force Academy’s new sexual assault policy mandates 
prompt disclosure of any allegation to superior officers: “All allegations of sexual assault 
will be reported to the officer chain of command immediately.”420  One in three civilian 
institutions of higher learning employs “designated mandatory reporters,” school officials 
who are required to report (sometimes confidentially) instances of rape or sexual assault 
to the police.421
The corroboration requirement from the criminal law of rape now influences the 
amount of evidence of sexual misconduct colleges and universities require for a violation 
of their disciplinary codes.  Harvard adopted a strong corroboration requirement in its 
formal sexual misconduct policy that it recently converted to a quieter demand: “students 
are asked to provide as much information as possible to support their allegations.”  
Harvard has indicated that it will not take disciplinary action against those students 
accused of rape unless the complainant provides such support.  Other schools may soon 
follow Harvard’s lead.
Four out of five campus disciplinary codes do not contain a standard of proof for 
the finding of sexual assault.422  This deficiency does not prevent an institution from 
informally holding sexual assault complaints to a higher standard of proof than other 
disciplinary complaints.  Because of the traditional bias against those who lodge claims 
of sexual assault generally, as well as the bias against those who bring claims of campus 
acquaintance rape specifically, there is reason to suspect that a double standard might 
infect the way some campus officials treat complaints of sexual assault.
The cautionary instruction from the criminal law has paved the way for campuses 
to react with extra suspicion to reports of sexual assault.  Sexual assault is widespread on 
college campuses yet it is vastly under-reported.  Victims who come forward have been 
subjected to intense counter-scrutiny and even scorn from both their peers and campus 
officials to whom they reported having been violated.  One manifestation of this counter-
scrutiny is the counter charges filed against victims who come forward with allegations 
of rape.  Both the Air Force Academy and Boston University have struggled with 
substantial negative publicity regarding the practice of disciplining students who come 
forward with allegations of rape on the basis of other (often alcohol or drug-related) 
disciplinary infractions.  A majority of colleges and universities do not provide rape 
victims who come forward to report their victimization amnesty from charges of alcohol 
or drug use.423
420 Agenda for Change, supra note 347 
421 KARJANE ET AL., supra note 201, at 77.
422 Id. at 120. 
423 ASSOCIATION FOR STUDENT JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, supra note 363.
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As a result, I propose the following provisions for campus sexual assault policies.  
My proposal is not a comprehensive policy on sexual assault; it is simply a set of three 
model provisions in areas of particular concern, given the influence of the prompt 
complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary instructions from the 
criminal law of rape.
1. Complaint Timing.  Victims are encouraged to report instances of sexual 
assault to campus authorities anonymously, confidentially, or publicly at any 
time.  Students may initiate disciplinary proceedings on the basis of sexual 
assault against any student currently enrolled at [applicable institution’s 
name].  
2. Standard of Proof.  The standard of proof for a violation of the disciplinary 
code for sexual assault shall be a preponderance of the evidence.  This 
standard requires that the complainant prove that an allegation is more 
probable than not.  A student who complains of sexual assault need not 
present additional evidence to corroborate the complaint.  The complainant’s 
testimony alone may be sufficient to prove that an allegation is more probable 
than not.
3. Amnesty for Disciplinary Infractions.  Ordinarily, a student who reports an 
instance of sexual assault to campus authorities shall be granted amnesty for 
other disciplinary infractions committed by that student on the instance in 
question.
The first model provision on complaint timing would abolish the influence of the 
criminal law’s prompt complaint requirement by encouraging reports of sexual assault at 
any time.  It emphasizes that the complainant can make a report anonymously, 
confidentially, or publicly, which would abolish non-confidential mandatory reporting 
rules in place at some institutions of higher learning.  The provision would grant the 
raped student, who has often had her sense of control destroyed, control over the amount 
of information she will reveal to authorities in terms of her identity and experience.  The 
first provision would also allow school disciplinary boards to curtail their jurisdiction in 
sexual assault cases to those circumstances that most affect campus life by authorizing 
disciplinary proceedings only against those who are currently enrolled.
The second model provision would abolish the influence that the corroboration 
requirement has on campus sexual assault policies and procedures by stating that a 
complainant need not present additional evidence to corroborate her complaint.  No 
external corroboration of the complainant’s testimony should be required at any stage of 
the process.  As we have seen, acquaintance rape victims often have few eyewitnesses, 
bruises, or other evidence to corroborate their assaults.424  None should be required.  A 
credible narrative that convinces the fact finder should be enough for a disciplinary 
adjudication in favor of the complainant.
The second model provision also prevents institutions from holding sexual assault 
complaints to a higher standard of proof than other disciplinary complaints.  The burden 
424 See supra notes 377-379 and accompanying text.
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of proof for a disciplinary violation on campus should not mimic the criminal law’s 
standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  The privilege of an education from
an institution of higher learning should be denied to students on evidence less serious 
than would subject them to criminal sanctions.  Being thrown out of the Air Force 
Academy is not the same as being thrown into the brig.  It should be easier to be expelled 
from Harvard than to be placed in a prison in the state of Massachusetts.  
Since eight of ten sexual assault policies on university campuses that include a 
standard of proof employ a “preponderance of the evidence” standard, I have included 
that level of proof as the appropriate one here.  Preponderance of the evidence, the 
burden of proof in civil cases, requires “evidence which is of greater weight or more 
convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it.”425  A small minority of 
campuses maintains a “clear and convincing” standard of proof for disciplinary 
proceedings.  Clear and convincing evidence requires proof of a “reasonable certainty” or 
high probability—something more than preponderance of the evidence, but less that 
beyond a reasonable doubt.426  Should an institution of higher learning maintain a clear 
and convincing standard of proof for other disciplinary infractions, it would be 
appropriate to include the same standard of proof in this provision.
Assuming that an institution adopts “preponderance of the evidence,” such a 
standard would allocate burdens to each side in a disciplinary action for sexual assault the 
same way that the burdens are allocated in a regular civil suit.  As in a civil suit, it is up 
to the decision-makers to assess the credibility of the witnesses.  If the only evidence 
submitted is the testimonies of the complainant and the accused (the so-called “he 
said/she said” circumstance), and the complainant’s story is more credible than the 
accused student’s story, the complainant should prevail.  If the narratives are equally 
credible, the accused student should prevail because the complainant would not have 
proven that the sexual assault was more probable than not.
The second model provision would also abolish the influence that the cautionary 
instruction has on campus sexual assault policies and procedures.  The testimony of a 
student who brings a claim of sexual assault against another student should not, merely 
because of the nature of that charge, be treated in any different manner than the testimony 
of a complaining witness in any other case.  The testimony should not be subject to extra 
scrutiny or additional burdens beyond that which regularly attend the evaluation of 
student charges.  This analysis is consonant with state criminal codes that have abolished 
the traditional cautionary instruction in rape cases.  South Dakota’s criminal law states: 
“The testimony of the complaining witness in a trial for a charge of a sex offense … may 
not, merely because of the nature of that charge, be treated in any different manner than 
the testimony of a complaining witness in any other criminal case.”427  Pennsylvania’s 
criminal code is similar: “The credibility of a complainant of an offense under this 
chapter shall be determined by the same standard as is the credibility of a complainant of 
any other crime.  … No instruction shall be given cautioning the jury to view the 
425 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 819 (6th ed. 1991).
426 Id. at 172.
427 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-22-15.1 (Michie 2003)).
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complainant’s testimony in any other way than that in which all complainants’ testimony 
is viewed.”428
The third and final model provision curtails the ability of campus sexual officials 
to counter-scrutinize students who come forward with allegations of rape.  As we have 
seen, most colleges and universities do not provide raped students with immunity from 
disciplinary charges related to the incident in question.  This provision grants those who 
complain to campus authorities of sexual assault routine amnesty for the (usually alcohol 
or drug-related) disciplinary infractions they engaged in on the instance in question.  The 
term “ordinarily” simply allows the campus some discretion to pursue disciplinary 
infractions related to the complainant’s actions on the instance in question if those actions 
were particularly egregious or otherwise extraordinary.  In the normal course of events, 
however, campus authorities should not pursue alcohol infractions against college 
students who are raped.  
Some might worry that such an amnesty provision would create an incentive for 
false rape complaints.  To assuage such a concern, one might look to the practice of 
police departments that receive complaints of crimes from the general public.  Police 
departments tend to ignore the relatively minor criminal infractions that a woman who 
reports a rape engaged in on the instance in question.  If a woman comes forward to 
report that she was raped by a man with whom she smoked marijuana on the instance in 
question, police do not respond by charging her with possession of a controlled 
substance.  They pursue the rape report.  Police understand that women are very unlikely 
to report rape if police prosecuted those women for any criminal offenses engaged in on 
the instance in question.  As a result, the third model provision removes a powerful tool 
campus administrators can use to deter and dismiss complaints of sexual assault.  
Conclusion
Danielle Bauer won five academic scholarships to attend Erskine College, a 
small, private, Presbyterian institution in Due West, South Carolina.429  In the fall of 
428 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §3106 (West 2002).  Colorado’s criminal code perhaps goes the furthest, 
stating:
In any criminal prosecution [for sexual assault, unlawful sexual contact, sexual assault on 
a child, or attempt of these crimes], the jury shall not be instructed to examine with 
caution the testimony of the victim solely because of the nature of the charge, nor shall 
the jury be instructed that such a charge is easy to make but difficult to defend against, 
nor shall any similar instruction be given.  However, the jury shall be instructed not to 
allow gender bias or any kind of prejudice based upon gender to influence the decision of 
the jury.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-408 (WEST 2002). Colorado courts have held that this statute is 
constitutional and allowed the following jury instructions to be issued.  In People v. Fierro, the Supreme 
Court of Colorado stated that the prohibition of the traditional cautionary instruction for rape cases does not 
deprive the defendant of “any right of constitutional dimensions, particularly in light of the fact that the 
jury in this case was correctly instructed concerning its duty to examine the credibility of each witness who 
testified at trial.”  606 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Colo. 1980). The applicable jury instruction on gender bias in 
Colorado is: “You are not to allow bias or prejudice, including gender bias, or any kind of prejudice based 
upon gender, to influence your decisions in this case.”  COLO. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL CH. 12(14).
429
 Summary Report of Psychological Counseling Services for Danielle Bauer from Dr. Joanne Armstrong 
of May 16, 2003, at 1 (on file with author) [hereinafter Summary Report].  Danielle Bauer disclosed her 
experiences to me and agreed to have me recount her story herein.  Telephone Interview with Danielle 
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2002, she enrolled in her first semester of classes.  One afternoon in November, her 
chemistry tutor Mark Ridgeway asked her to come to his dorm room and, after she 
arrived, they began kissing.  He asked Danielle for sex but she refused.  He then 
maneuvered his way on top of her and leaned his shoulder deeply into her neck. Danielle 
lost consciousness and he raped her.430
Danielle went to the hospital emergency room that night.  She asked for a rape kit 
examination, but the attending nurse told her that the hospital would only perform such 
an exam if Danielle knew for sure that she was going to press charges against her 
assailant.431  Danielle, confused and traumatized, was not sure what to do.  Although the 
attending nurse gave Danielle the phone number of the Rape Crisis hotline, she refused to 
give her an exam.432
According to the psychologist she had to see as a result of the attack, Danielle 
suffered “significant psychological distress and a loss of daily functioning.”433  Although 
Danielle had “no previous history of depression or anxiety,” she suffered from “a drastic 
decline in her academic, emotional, and social functioning immediately following the 
rape attack.”434  She “experienced suicidal thoughts, repetitive intrusive thoughts about 
the assault, self-mutilating behavior, feeling dirty and worthless, severe sleep disturbance, 
anxiety attacks, shaking, crying spells, weight loss, impaired concentration, mood swings, 
intense anger, loss of self-confidence, and social withdrawal.”435
When Danielle mustered the courage to report her rape to Erskine College 
officials, they ignored the situation for months, insisting that they could not be expected 
to handle a sexual assault case.436  It was not until Danielle reported the rape to the local 
police department in April of 2003 and her assailant was indicted for first-degree sexual 
assault that Erskine officials relented to Danielle’s repeated requests for a school 
hearing.437
At the hearing on the matter, Erskine officials found her assailant not guilty of 
sexual assault.  They then put Danielle on trial, introducing witnesses who said she was a 
sorority girl who wore provocative clothing and drank.438  A dean then argued that 
Danielle had perhaps made up the whole story because she was doing poorly in a biology 
class and wanted a medical leave from school to maintain her scholarships.439  Officials 
then found both Danielle and her assailant guilty of “sexual misconduct.”440
Bauer, sophomore student at Erskine College (March 2, 2004) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter 
Telephone Interview].
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 Letter from John Wingard, Chairman of the Erskine College Discipline and Appeals Committee, to 
Danielle Bauer of Aug. 12, 2003 (on file with author).  Sexual misconduct” was defined as conduct that 
was “detrimental to the spiritual, physical, emotional, or moral well-being of members of the Erskine 
College Community.”  Id.
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Danielle appealed.  Her first appeal affirmed the decisions made the hearing.441
Danielle appealed again.  At this final appeal, the president of Erskine College, John 
Carson, affirmed the determination that her assailant was not guilty of sexual assault.442
Carson noted, “neither I nor any other human being can look within the heart of another 
human being let alone two human beings and determine what motives are there, we can 
only look at the limited evidence which can be produced.”443
Carson then decided to reverse the sexual misconduct findings against both 
parties.  He felt the need to emphasize, however, that he was “especially grieved” to have 
to do so.444  Referring to the kissing that preceded the rape, he noted, “I can in no way 
condone the sexual involvement which was consensual up to the point of debate between 
the two parties.”445  Carson wrote to Danielle: 
I grieve that this decision is contrary to my personal beliefs with respect to 
upholding a standard of conduct which is appropriate between a man and a 
woman and contrary to the standard of conduct of the Erskine community.  
Your actions not only affect you but also every member of the Erskine 
community—whether student, faculty, or staff.  I pray that all of us will 
consider the serious nature of our decisions and seek God’s forgiveness.446
One might be tempted to conclude that Danielle’s story is exceptional.  But other 
colleges and universities have responded to women’s reports of having been raped by 
charging them with a variety of disciplinary infractions, making Danielle’s story far from 
unique.  Set aside their sanctimony and Erskine College officials echo General Gilbert at 
the Air Force Academy, who insisted:
[I]f I walk down a dark alley with hundred-dollar bills hanging out of my 
pockets, it doesn’t justify my being attacked or robbed, but I certainly 
increased the risks by doing what I did.  The behavior [Lisa] engaged in is 
not behavior we condone for our cadets or our officers in the Air Force.447
Officials at both institutions mimic the Boston University’s general counsel Robert Smith 
who declared that his school: 
cannot guarantee the safety of students from their own irresponsibility or 
voluntary conduct.  We cannot prevent them from making poor choices.  
441 Id.   Wingard informed Danielle in writing that the appeals committee affirmed the finding that she was 
guilty of sexual misconduct.  He opined, “It is our hope and prayer that this very trying experience will 
result ultimately in your growth in grace.”  Id.
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 Letter from John Carson, President of Erskine College, to Danielle Bauer of Oct. 14, 2003 (on file with 
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[Kristin] made poor choices, drank and behaved badly earlier in the 
evening.448
Each of these officials, deeply suspicious of women who allege sexual assault, acts as if 
chastising Potiphar’s wife.  He seeks to place the blame for the incident squarely on the 
woman’s shoulders.  She failed to personify a model of sexual virtue and so should be 
held responsible for the attack.  She failed to report the rape to the police promptly 
enough.  She failed to present hard, corroborating evidence.  School officials cannot be 
expected to plumb the depths of the human heart.  They “can only look at the limited 
evidence which can be produced.”449
The prompt complaint requirement, corroboration requirement, and cautionary 
instructions in the criminal law of rape evinced the belief that, because women lie about 
rape, men accused of it need special legal protection beyond that which the law affords 
defendants accused of other crimes. Officials at some colleges and universities have now 
adopted similar beliefs about female students who come forward with allegations of 
campus rape.  Importing new versions of these ancient policies from the criminal law 
institutionalizes their grave skepticism of women.  It is important to connect these 
retrograde policies with their discredited past and reject them both in the remaining state 
laws in which they withstand old age and in campus disciplinary procedures in which 
they are just being born.
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